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ABSTRACT 
We investigate the simultaneous relationship among bank capital, risk and profitability, but also 
considering bank ownership and the emergence of Pan-African cross-border banks. We specify 
a simultaneous equation model and estimate it using hand-collected bank level data from all 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries for 2000-2014. We split the 
countries into lower middle-income (LMICs) and low-income (LICs) according to the World 
Bank classification. We uncover evidence that the sensitivity of bank profitability to an increase 
in capital ratio seems to be somewhat higher in LMICs (+0.10) than in LICs (+0.05). Moreover, 
we find that bank capital positions tend to comove positively with the business cycle in LICs, 
mimicking a key postulate of Basel III. After differentiating between cross-border Pan-African 
banks and foreign banks from outside the continent, we find that the overall effect of bank 
ownership on risk depends on the origin of banks (French versus Pan-African). These findings 
are robust to alternative estimation techniques and the use of competing measures of risk and 
profitability. 
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1. Introduction  
The current Basel Capital Accord (Basel III) regulation proposes to increase bank capital 
adequacy ratio to contain risk-taking behaviour and contribute to making the banking sector 
more stable and resilient to crises. However, policy makers have mixed views on high capital 
requirements. For example, at the G20 meetings on July 22-23, 2016 at Chengdu, China, 
European Union Finance Ministers sought to protect their banks from high capital 
requirements.3 The concern is that while they may provide a buffer against unexpected losses, 
high capital requirements constrain the banks’ capacity to lend. On the one hand, an increase in 
capital requirements in the post-crisis environment – where the main concern is to strengthen 
financial institutions – will likely support resilience and increase lending in the banking sector 
(e.g., Kim and Sohn, 2017; Altunbas et al., 2016; Noss and Toffano, 2016; Buch and Prieto, 
2014; Berrospide and Edge, 2010). On the other hand, high capital requirements may constrain 
banks’ capacity to lend because equity funding is costly (e.g., Aiyar et al., 2014; Bridges et al., 
2014; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Kishan and Opiela, 2000).  
Beyond this ambiguous relationship between bank capital and lending, what is more curious 
is the exact impact of bank capital on bank risk-taking and bank profitability, as these three 
interrelated indicators (capital, risk and profitability) affect bank asset allocation and lending in 
a simultaneous manner. Indeed, while some researchers document a positive relationship 
between capital and risk, i.e. bank capital and bank risk appetite increase together (e.g., 
Altunbas et al., 2007), others find a negative relationship between capital and risk, i.e. banks 
tend to increase (decrease) their risk positions as capital declines (increases) (e.g., Guidara et 
al., 2013; Lee and Hsieh, 2013). Similar dichotomous conclusions have been found regarding 
the relationship between bank capital and bank profitability. For instance, while Iannotta et al. 
(2007), among many others, found that a high level of bank capital is associated with a high 
level of bank profitability, others such as Goddard et al. (2013) uncovered an inverse 
relationship between the two indicators. Overall, these issues remain unresolved, 
notwithstanding the urgent need for research to inform policy on implications of adopting high 
bank capital requirements as an integral component of Basel III. 
This paper responds to the above demand for more knowledge by policy makers as well as 
the gaps in existing research. It aims to investigate the simultaneous relationship among capital, 
risk and profitability in the banking sector of the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
                                                 





(WAEMU). Several reasons justify the relevance of this study to the WAEMU banking sector. 
Firstly, the financial sector of the WAEMU4 region is bank-based; i.e. banks are the 
predominant source of finance for businesses and households (see Appendix B for statistics 
related to access to financial services). In such an economic environment, increasing the bank 
capital adequacy ratio may constrain the lending capacity of banks, notwithstanding the 
possible benefit of providing a healthy banking system. Nevertheless, following several other 
banking sector regulators around the World, especially from the developed economies, the 
WAEMU regional banking sector regulator adopted the new Basel III regulatory framework in 
June 2016, which subsequently became effective on January 1st, 2018. The adoption constituted 
a steep jump from the Basel I regulation to the more complex Basel III regulation.5 The effects 
of this new regulation on the region banking sector and its economy have yet to be proven, and 
to the best of our knowledge, no such study exists. In addition, we are not aware of any empirical 
investigation on the possible impact of the implementation of Basel III regulation in the 
WAEMU economies on bank risk and profitability in the region. There is need, therefore, of an 
empirical study that can serve as a guiding tool towards the implementation of Basel III 
framework in the WAEMU region and in other similar developing economies. 
Secondly, although a substantial body of research exists on the relationship among bank 
capital, risk and profitability, the literature focuses mostly on the banking sector in developed 
economies (mostly U.S. and European banks) and banks in emerging markets in Asia,6 with 
much less attention paid to the banking sector in the developing economies of Africa, 
particularly in the WAEMU region. The question that arises is whether the results found with 
respect to developed economies are meaningful for the WAEMU region. Moreover, the existing 
studies rely mainly on Bankscope data to construct the sample of banks (which covers less than 
75% of banks in the region), perhaps missing valuable information on the WAEMU context. 
This region is, therefore, an interesting laboratory for investigation.  
                                                 
4 The WAEMU region is a common economic and monetary union of eight least developed countries (Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) which share a common currency (the 
CFA Franc or XOF) pegged to the Euro. The CFA Franc was pegged to the French Franc before the introduction 
of the Euro. Based on the World Bank 2016’s country classification, two of the eight countries of the region, Ivory 
Coast and Senegal, are among the group of lower-middle-income economies, while the other six countries belong 
to the low-income economies group. 
5 The regulation until December 31st, 2017 was mainly based on Basel I regulatory framework with a minimum 
capital adequacy ratio of 8% and a constraint on banks’ core capital that must be at least equal to the statutory 
minimum capital (BCEAO, 2013). Table A1 gives a summary of the prudential framework in WAEMU until 
December 31st, 2017. 




Thirdly, as shown later in the empirical section (Table 8), bank ownership in the region has 
been dominated by foreign investors and over the last decade there has been a steady increase 
in the share of cross-border Pan-African banks. There is a debate on the relationship between 
capital ownership and risk-taking behaviour of banks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study to investigate the effect of the entry of pan-African banks in the WAEMU on banks’ 
risk-taking, profitability and capital.  
Along with the focus on the banking sector in the WAEMU, this paper makes four 
contributions to the existing literature by providing answers to the following research questions: 
How sensitive is bank profitability to changes in bank capital ratio in WAEMU? How sensitive 
is bank risk-taking to changes in bank capital ratio in WAEMU? What is the relationship 
between bank capital and the business cycle in WAEMU? Does bank ownership status matter 
in WAEMU? 
For the first contribution, we analyse the relationship between bank capital and profitability. 
The well-established puzzle in corporate finance is that leverage is inversely correlated with 
measures of profitability (Danis et al., 2014). The main prediction arises from the static trade-
off theory of capital structure, which posits that firms choose levels of debt in order to balance 
the benefits of the tax-shield with the costs of future financial distress (Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
But, some recent studies which introduce capital adjustment into a dynamic trade-off model 
find evidence for both positive and negative relationship between profitability and leverage 
(Danis et al., 2014). The puzzle persists. Moreover, standard pecking order theory predicts that 
firms have a pecking order of the choices they make for increasing leverage, starting with 
retained earnings (if the firms is generating more profits), then bank debt and finally issuing of 
equity capital. Specifically, in the presence of asymmetric information, a firm typically follows 
a hierarchy of financing choices, in which the final choice is to issue new equity (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). Profitable firms are more likely to generate more retained earnings; hence these 
firms do not need to depend so much on external finance; accordingly, the pecking order theory 
predicts a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. We test the relationship 
between capital and profitability of WAEMU banks, in the context of the predictions of the 
trade-off theory (inverse as well as positive relationship) and the pecking order theory (inverse 
relationship) from the corporate finance literature.  
For the second contribution, we investigate if bank risk-taking behaviour in the WAEMU 
is sensitive to bank capital. The regulatory hypothesis predicts that better capitalised banks are 




their risk positions as capital declines. Therefore, there are two conflicting views regarding the 
effect of bank capital on risk-taking. Our empirical analysis will shed light on which one of 
these hypotheses holds for WAEMU banks.  
For the third contribution, we try to understand how banks build their capital ratios. 
Specifically, we are interested in the dynamics of bank capital adjustment during the business 
cycle, mainly because a key postulate of the Basel III Accord is that banks can build strong 
capital buffers to achieve a countercyclical outcome. This is consistent with the theoretical 
literature which has identified the liquidity channel and the lending channel as being two of the 
main mechanisms through which business cycles affect banks activities.7 After a 
macroeconomic shock, banks may face liquidity shortage, and this may affect their lending 
capability, given the limited resources available (Shleifer and Vishny, 2010; Allen and Gale, 
2004; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). In addition, because of the increased uncertainty on 
borrowers’ ability to repay during economic downturns, it increases banks temptation to cut 
their loan volume (Berger and Udell, 2004; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Hence, in the context of 
the Basel III regulatory framework in the WAEMU region, we would like to know how bank 
capital buffers behave throughout the business cycle.  
Finally, for the fourth contribution, we study whether the presence of Pan-African banks 
affects the relationship among bank capital, risk and profitability. The banking sector in the 
WAEMU region is dominated by foreign banks, and over the last decade, the share of cross-
border Pan-African banks has steadily increased. Pan-African banks are indigenous African 
banks whose headquarters are in Africa. While the proportion of foreign banks grew from 63% 
in 2000 to 79% in 2015, that of cross-border Pan-African banks steadily increased from 29% in 
2000 to 64% in 2015. Given this feature on the ownership structure in the banking sector of the 
region, it is then appropriate to see how the increasing presence of foreign banks and cross-
border Pan-African banks has affected the dynamics among capital, risk and profitability. The 
literature provides two contrasting predictions about bank ownership and risk-taking 
behaviour8. While the theory of market risk argues that foreign banks are riskier than domestic 
banks due to their limited knowledge of the host-country market (e.g., Iannotta et al., 2007; 
Gleason et al., 2006; Amihud et al., 2002), other studies, such as Barry et al. (2011), Berger et 
al. (2005) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997), show that foreign ownership is associated with lower 
risk since these banks may also have better access to capital markets, superior ability to 
                                                 
7 See Brunnermeier (2009) for a summary of the different channels.  




diversify risks and access to superior technologies for collecting and assessing “hard” 
quantitative information. We examine the empirical validity of the two views in explaining the 
difference in risk-taking between cross-border Pan-African and non-Pan-African banks in the 
WAEMU. 
Using hand-collected bank level data from all WAEMU countries for 2000-2014, this paper 
contributes to the ongoing debate by providing evidence relating to the potential impact of the 
current Basel III regulatory changes on the region banking system. The paper relies on official 
bank balance sheet data, which is an interesting alternative to the Bankscope data that do not 
cover the African countries very well, as shown in Table 1 in which we compare our dataset 
with that of Bankscope. Also, we split the countries into lower middle-income (LMICs) and 
low-income (LICs) according to the World Bank classification. We uncover four new important 
findings. Firstly, we find that higher capital ratios are associated with better profitability. The 
effect of bank capital on profitability seems to be somewhat higher in LMICs (+0.10) than in 
LICs (+0.05). Secondly, we uncover a positive relationship between risk and capital, consistent 
with the regulatory hypothesis: on average, one-unit percentage increase in capital ratio leads 
to 1.2 basis points increase in banks’ credit risk (loan loss reserves ratio) in LMICs and 23.8 
basis points increase in banks’ risk (Z-score) in LICs. Thirdly, we find that bank capital 
positions tend to comove positively with business cycle in LICs as opposed to their LMICs 
peers, meaning that banks in LICs build up excess capital buffer during expansion and use the 
additional capital during recession to cover excess risk. Fourthly, the results show that 
international foreign banks (mainly French) lend more and are bigger in size than domestically-
owned and cross-border Pan-African banks. It seems that domestic banks and cross-border Pan-
African banks have higher risk-taking appetite. One possible explanation is that domestic and 
cross-border Pan-African banks strive to attract customers from well entrenched international 
foreign-owned banks and tend to be lax in granting credit. Perhaps, these banks attract less good 
customers who are not able to get credit with well-entrenched international foreign-owned 
banks.  
Overall, the heterogeneity in levels of financial sector development and the institutional 
background of countries in WAEMU region seem to matter. Also, the findings are robust to the 
use of alternative measures of risk and profitability as well as alternative estimation techniques. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the 
related literature and the main hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data, the model and the 




bivariate analyses. Section 5 presents the multivariate empirical results, including additional 
robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2. Related literature and hypotheses development 
There is a rich theoretical and empirical literature, exploring the relationship among capital, 
risk and profitability in the banking sector9, which is related to this paper. The theoretical 
literature offers two conflicting views on the relationship between bank performance and bank 
capital. The static trade-off-theory states that firms balance tax savings from debt against 
deadweight bankruptcy costs. This theory predicts a negative relationship between bank’s 
profitability and capital, where profitable firms are expected to have more debt (e.g., Jensen, 
1986). However, capital adjustment plays an important role; for example, when Danis et al. 
(2014) introduce leverage rebalancing in a dynamic trade-off model, they find a positive 
relationship between leverage and profitability, but with further rebalancing towards an 
optimum leverage level, they find that at times the cross-section correlation between leverage 
and profitability is negative.  
In addition, another interesting theory of corporate capital structure, the pecking-order 
theory, predicts an inverse relationship between profitability and leverage. In the presence of 
asymmetric information, a firm typically follows a hierarchy of financing choices. The firm 
prefers internal finance first, but if internal capital is insufficient, the firm issues debt. The last 
alternative is to issue new equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Profitable firms are more likely to 
generate more retained earnings; hence these firms do not need to depend so much on external 
finance. It follows that highly profitable firms tend to deplete their internal capital first rather 
than face the last resort of going for external finance and exposing themselves to external 
monitoring and possible loss of control to new shareholders, such that firm leverage decreases 
with profitability. The adverse selection costs of issuing equity are large enough to render either 
costs or benefits of debt and equity second order.  
In terms of empirical verification, the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory have 
experienced both successes and challenges10. However, we argue that bank capital could serve 
as a cushion to increase the share of risky assets, such as loans. Although the existing literature 
presents an ambiguous view on the effect of bank capital on lending, we base our argument on 
                                                 
9 See, for instance, Goddard et al. (2013), Guidara et al. (2013), Lee and Hsieh (2013), Jokipii and Milne (2011), 
Altunbas et al. (2007), Iannotta et al. (2007), Goddard et al. (2004), Rime (2001), Jacques and Nigro (1997), Kwan 
and Eisenbeis (1997), and Shrieves and Dahl (1992), among many others.  




the assumption that holding a large share of capital is a signal of creditworthiness, especially in 
the context of WAEMU where banks are the main source of finance for businesses and 
households. In this context, we further argue that well-capitalised banks tend to borrow less to 
support their asset (lending) expansion compared to undercapitalised banks, suggesting a 
positive relationship between bank capital and profitability. Indeed, some empirical studies find 
support to this theoretical prediction that bank’s capital is positively related to bank 
performance (Dietrich-Wanzenried, 2014; Goddard et al., 2004; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2000; Berger, 1995), even in Sub-Saharan Africa (Munyambonera, 2013). Given these 
empirical results and our arguments about the special role of bank capital in support of bank 
confidence to lend and increase profitability, we formulate the bank capital and bank 
profitability hypothesis, as: 
Hypothesis 1: A positive relationship exists between capital and profitability among banks in 
WAEMU. 
Our paper is also related to the theoretical and empirical literature examining the 
relationship between bank capital and risk-taking. This literature is driven by the regulatory 
hypothesis and the moral-hazard hypothesis. The former posits that regulators encourage banks 
to hold more capital to cover risk exposure. In this context, a positive relationship between 
capital and risk may be attributed to the actions of regulators and supervisors (Altunbas et al., 
2007; Shrieves and Dahl, 1992). What is rather complex is the causality of the inverse 
relationship between bank capital and risk. It is intuitive to expect that as the bank builds more 
capital the impact is to reduce risk. But another possibility is offered by the moral hazard 
hypothesis whereby banks tend to increase their risk positions as capital declines, when their 
leverage and risk positions are already high. Our empirical analysis will help shed light on 
which one of these hypotheses hold for WAEMU banks. Specifically, we expect the behaviour 
of WAEMU banks to be supported by the regulatory hypothesis, i.e. bank risk increases with 
bank capital, because of the strong role of the regulator since the banking crisis of the 1980s, 
whereby the regulator has provided an enabling environment to support the ability of banks to 
lend (see Table A1). Based on the foregoing argument and related evidence in the literature, we 
formulate our second hypothesis as: 
Hypothesis 2: In WAEMU, as bank capital increases, bank risk-taking also goes up.   
Furthermore, the theoretical banking literature argues that following a macroeconomic 
shock, banks may face liquidity shortage from both wholesale market and depositors, which 




and Gertler, 1989). In addition, because of the increased uncertainty on borrowers’ ability to 
repay, banks may ration credit to remain solvent (Berger and Udell, 2004; Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981). Empirical evidence on the relationship between banks’ capital buffers and the business 
cycle is conflicting. A positive co-movement has been found by Guidara et al. (2013), Stolz and 
Wedow (2011) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2007), among many others, implying that banks 
must accumulate capital during economic booms, to be used during troughs when capital is 
scarce and costly. However, negative co-movement between bank capital and the business cycle 
has been documented by Behn et al. (2016), Repullo and Suarez (2013), Shim (2013), Jopikii 
and Milne (2008), Ayuso et al. (2004), Lindquist (2004), among many others, suggesting that 
banks’ capital ratio is higher during recessions and lower during economic expansions. In this 
paper, we expect a positive relationship between bank capital and the business cycle. In fact, 
banks in WAEMU tend to ride on the business cycle to meet not only the minimum capital 
requirement effective since 2008, but also to transition from Basel I to Basel II and III. Hence, 
we formulate our third hypothesis as follows. 
Hypothesis 3: A positive relationship exists between bank capital and the business cycle in 
WAEMU. 
Finally, our work is related to the growing literature on the impact of the presence of cross-
border banks on the domestic banking system11, especially their effect on capital, risk and 
profitability. The bank ownership literature provides two contrasting predictions about 
ownership and risk-taking behaviour. On the one hand, the market risk theory argues that 
foreign banks are riskier than domestic banks because the former face an information 
disadvantage (limited knowledge) in the host-country market due to problems in managing from 
a distance and accessing ‘‘soft’’ qualitative information about local conditions (e.g., Berger et 
al., 2003; Buch 2003). Also, some studies suggest that new entrants in the banking market incur 
higher risk (e.g. high level of non-performing loans) because they compete by granting loans 
mostly to insolvent customers that shift from incumbent banks (e.g., Chen et al., 2017; Iannotta 
et al., 2007; Gleason et al., 2006; Amihud et al., 2002). On the other hand, foreign-owned banks 
may also have better access to capital markets, superior ability to diversify risks, access to 
superior technologies for collecting and assessing “hard” quantitative information. Therefore, 
foreign ownership could be associated with lower risk (e.g., Barry et al., 2011; Berger et al., 
                                                 
11 See Pelletier (2018), Chen et al. (2017), Beck (2015), Kodongo et al. (2015), Claessens and van Horen (2015, 
2014a, 2014b), Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014), Cull and Martinez Peria (2010), Detragiache et al. (2008), 




2005; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Moreover, foreign banks might realize higher profitability 
than domestic banks in developing countries due to their higher operational efficiency and 
lower cost of funding (Pelletier, 2018; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014; Micco et al., 2007). We 
expect a positive relationship between foreign ownership and bank performance, as in Pelletier 
(2018) and Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014), but also possible is a negative relationship with 
risk as in Berger et al. (2005). Hence, based on the above theoretical and empirical literature, 
and given the intrinsic structure of the WAEMU banking structure, with entrenched French 
banks, we predict that bank ownership matters in WAEMU. Further, since Pan-African cross-
border banks have expanded rapidly into the regional banking sector, these banks will more 
likely intensify competition within the industry. However, given the fact that French banks are 
the oldest and are well entrenched into the region banking system, the new comers need to 
expand credit to less creditworthy borrowers. We therefore argue that Pan-African ownership 
is associated with an increase in risk-taking in WAEMU. Hence, we formulate our fourth 
hypothesis as follows. 
Hypothesis 4: Pan-African bank ownership increases bank risk-taking in WAEMU. 
3. Sample, model and variables 
3.1 Sample 
We hand-collect the data from annual balance sheet reports of banks operating in the 
WAEMU region from 2000 to 2014. It is the unique dataset made available by the Banking 
Commission of WAEMU. The dataset is preferable to Bankscope data and helps to avoid 
selection bias since while all the banks of the region do not necessarily report to Bankscope, 
they are all required to report to the Banking Commission of WAEMU. Indeed, Error! 
Reference source not found. compares our sample with the number of banks in Bankscope. 
From this table, it appears that 29 out of 113 banks do not report to Bankscope, representing 
26% of the sample. In addition, we report the number of listed banks. Only 10 banks are listed. 
Moreover, in the WAEMU regional stock market, many of the listed stocks are not traded 
frequently, making many of the observed market variables less reliable in this context.12 We 
therefore prefer to rely on accounting audited financial statements data, which are readily 
available and more reliable. 
 
                                                 
12 The turnover ratio, i.e. the trading value as a proportion of market capitalisation, was 3.1% in the regional stock 





Comparison between our hand-collected data sample and Bankscope data sample 
This table reports, for each of the WAEMU countries, the number of banks in our 
sample, the number of banks in Bankscope and the number of listed banks.  
Country 
Number of banks 
Sample of the paper Bankscope Listed 
Benin 13 9 1 
Burkina Faso 13 10 2 
Ivory Coast 26 18 4 
Guinea-Bissau 4 1 0 
Mali 13 11 0 
Niger 11 7 1 
Senegal 20 20 1 
Togo 13 8 1 
Total 113 84 10 
 
The sample contains all type of banks (commercial, investment, private and public) as 
defined by the Banking Commission of WAEMU. We attempt to classify banks in terms of 
public versus private ownership based on the proportion of shares owned by the state and 
private investors. A bank is classified as state-owned if the public sector (the government or a 
government alike entity enterprise) of the country in which it operates (host country) is the main 
shareholder or the public sector in the home country is the main shareholder of the parent 
company. Only 27.15% of our sample (bank-year) are state-owned banks.  
Although some banks (one per country except for Guinea-Bissau) bear the name of 
investment banks, it is not easy to differentiate them from their commercial peers based on their 
name or their balance sheet information. First, we do not know, from the balance sheet, the type 
of activities in which each bank is involved. Second, the asset side of the balance sheet does 
not allow us to identify the type and the maturity of the assets because this information is not 
reported. Hence, to avoid possible misclassification, we do not categorise the banks.  
Our sample is composed of 113 banks over the study period 2000-2014, including surviving 
banks, non-surviving banks and merged banks. In 2014, the total number of surviving and new 
banks in the region was 107. This gap in the data is due to mergers and acquisitions over the 
sample period. We consider each bank over its period of existence and combine some 
observations in case of mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, any bank for which balance sheet 
information is available is considered in our analysis. Ivory Coast (26) and Senegal (20) have 




The total number of observations is 1,293 and the average number of observations per bank is 
11 (varying between 2 and 15). 3.2 The econometric model 
We take inspiration from the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory of corporate 
capital structure, in terms of the predictions for the relationship between profitability and 
leverage. We also note that capital adjustment is important as highlighted in Section 2. In 
addition, we seek a theoretical and empirical framework that can capture the simultaneous 
interactions among capital, risk and profitability. For that matter, we adopt the partial 
adjustment framework of Rime (2001), Jacques and Nigro (1997) and Shrieves and Dahl 
(1992), by assuming that banks target optimal capital, risk and profitability levels toward which 
they adjust partially each period. The partial adjustment model is justified here by the fact that 
capital building, risk-adjustment and profit-generating activities are time sensitive and resource 
consuming, and banks cannot adjust totally these variables during a single period.  
Denoting by ∆Yit the variable of interest, the partial adjustment behaviour is: 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆(𝑌𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝑖𝑡,         (1) 
where i indexes bank, t indexes year and ηit is the idiosyncratic error term. Equation (1) reads 
as follows: Each year, banks adjust a proportion 𝜆 (0 < 𝜆 < 1) of the difference between their 
desired (or long-term) level 𝑌𝑖𝑡
∗ and their actual level, 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1. We assume that the long-term target 
𝑌𝑖𝑡
∗  is a function of bank characteristics and is expressed as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝛽
∗,          (2) 
where Xit-1 is the vector of bank-level variables and macroeconomic indicators. Plugging (2) 
into (1) yields:  
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆(𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝛽
∗ − 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝑖𝑡 = −𝜆𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝜆𝛽
∗ + 𝑖𝑡.   (3) 
However, unlike earlier studies (e.g., Rime, 2001; Jacques and Nigro, 1997; and Shrieves 
and Dahl, 1992) which use a system of two simultaneous equations, we consider a system of 
three simultaneous equations, as in Guidara et al. (2013), Altunbas et al. (2007) and Kwan and 
Eisenbeis (1997), to cope with potential endogeneity between capital, risk and profitability. We 
therefore consider the following system of simultaneous equations:  






+ 𝜇1𝑖 + 𝜐1𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (4) 
















+ 𝜇3𝑖 + 𝜐3𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (6) 
where i=1,…,N and t=1,…,T denote bank and time respectively, 𝜇1𝑖 , 𝜇2𝑖 , 𝜇3𝑖 are unobserved 
bank-specific effects and 𝜈1𝑡 , 𝜈2𝑡 , 𝜈3𝑡 are time-specific effects, 𝑖𝑡, 𝑖𝑡 and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 are idiosyncratic 
error terms. The parameters 𝛼1, 𝛽1, 𝛾1 correspond to −𝜆 (see equation (3)). Therefore, they are 
expected to be negative. 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡, and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 are, respectively, the profitability, risk 
and capital ratio indicators of bank i at time t. 𝑋1𝑖𝑡 , 𝑋2𝑖𝑡 , … , 𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 are bank-specific control 
variables, 𝑍1𝑗𝑡 , 𝑍2𝑗𝑡 , … , 𝑍𝐾𝑗𝑡 are macroeconomic and institutional quality factors described 
below and j=1,…,8 is the country in which the bank operates. The parameters to be estimated 
are 𝛿, , 𝜗, 𝜌,  and 𝜉 as well as 𝛼, 𝛽 and 𝛾. 
Equations (4) and (5) are designed to examine the impact of capital adjustment on bank 
profitability and risk, respectively. Equation (6) captures the simultaneous capital adjustment 
dynamic of the banks. Besides addressing endogeneity issues, this equation allows us to study 
the sensitiveness of bank capital to changes in risk and profitability.  
3.3 Variables 
3.3.1 Endogenous variables: Capital, risk and profitability measures 
We proxy bank capital ratio by total equity-to-asset ratio (CAR), as commonly done in 
the literature, e.g. Guidara et al. (2013) and Flannery and Rangan (2008). Capital is computed 
using the BCEAO (2013) definition of core and supplementary capital.13 For the profitability 
indicator (PROFIT), we use three alternative indicators to measure profitability: return-on-
assets (ROA), return-on-equity (ROE) and net-interest-margin to total assets ratio (NIM).14 As 
mentioned before, over the study period, the prudential framework in the WAEMU region is 
based essentially on the Basel I regulation. However, the BCEAO and the Banking Commission 
adopted the Basel III regulatory frameworks with effect on January 1st, 2018. This study can 
therefore serve as a guiding tool towards its successful implementation. As summarized in 
Appendix A, risk is managed by imposing some solvency ratios to each bank of the Union: 
                                                 
13 The capital ratio is equivalent to the non-risk based leverage ratio imposed by Basel III regulation. As alternative 
measure of capital, we could use the risk-based capital adequacy ratio, proxied by capital to risk-weighted assets 
(RWA); unfortunately, we do not have enough detailed information to compute the RWA, we therefore rely only 
on capital-to-asset ratio. Nevertheless, this latter variable is appropriate and will yield similar results as will capital-
to-RWA, since in this region, RWA measures are composed of credit risk and assets are mainly loans.  
14 We do not use market variables, such as stock returns, since most of these banks in the WAEMU region are 
not listed on the regional stock market. Even when they are listed, many of these stocks do not trade for many 





minimum capital amount requirement, risk coverage ratio (also known as the risk-based capital 
adequacy ratio), liquidity ratio and limitation of commitments on a same signature.  
To assess the quality of bank assets, the Banking Commission uses the gross rate of 
banks’ portfolio deterioration defined as the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. 
Unfortunately, due to data constraints15, we are unable to compute this indicator at the micro 
bank level. Instead, we use the following two alternative measures to capture bank’s risk 
(RISK): loan loss reserves over total loan (LLRL) and the inverse Z-score calculated on ROA.  
Loan loss reserves (LLRL) is the portion of a bank’s cash or cash equivalent holdings set aside 
to cover estimated potential losses in its loan portfolio. If the banks are more exposed to credit 
risk, the loan loss reserves will be higher, otherwise it will be lower. LLRL measures essentially 
credit risk. Indeed, lending is the main source of profit generating activities of banks in 
developing countries, like those of WAEMU, and that because financial markets are less 
developed, therefore companies and households rely more on bank loans. This indicator has 
been used by Altunbas et al. (2007) among others. 
As opposite to loan loss reserves, Z-score is a risk measure commonly used to reflect a 
bank’s probability of insolvency, e.g. Lepetit and Strobel (2013) and Hesse and Čihák (2007). 
According to these later authors, the indicator is inversely related to the probability of 
insolvency of the bank; therefore, an increase in the Z-score indicates a decrease in the bank’s 




,        (7) 
where, 𝐸[𝑅𝑂𝐴] stands for expected return on average assets, 𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴) denotes standard 
deviation of return on assets and 𝐸[𝐶𝐴𝑅] is the average bank’s capital-to-assets ratio. We use 
a three-year rolling window to compute the averages and standard deviation in equation (7). 
To facilitate the interpretation in terms of risk, we use a transformed version of the 
standard Z-score; that is:  
𝑍-𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒̃ = max(𝑍-𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) − 𝑍-𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒.      (8) 
For the remainder of the paper, we refer to this transformed version as the Z-score 
measure. Therefore, an increase in the new Z-score indicator, called “inverse” Z-score, indicates 
an increase in a bank’s risk exposure. 
                                                 




We use these two indicators (loan loss reserves and Z-score) because of their simplicity 
and because they are based on accounting information, which is readily available in developing 
countries, in contrast to market-based risk measures. These accounting measures of risk are, to 
the best of our knowledge, suitable to capture bank risk exposure in this region because of the 
limited depth of local financial markets. In fact, the money, bond, interbank and stock markets 
are not sufficiently developed (Kireyev, 2015). Particularly, the stock market is very shallow: 
the market capitalization in the region is only ten percent (10%) of GDP, with less than forty 
(40) listed firms, and less than ten (10) banks actively participating in the regional stock 
exchange. The equity risk exposure of the banks is therefore very limited. In addition, Beaver 
et al. (1970) note that accounting information is useful in assessing firm specific risk. 
3.3.2 Foreign ownership and Pan-African bank status 
We add the ownership structure of bank capital (foreign versus domestic) to discriminate 
between foreign and domestic banks. The FOREIGN dummy takes 1 when foreigners hold more 
than 50% of the bank capital, and zero otherwise. We expect foreign-owned banks to perform 
better, to hold higher capital ratios and to bear less risk than domestic or nationally-owned 
banks (Chen et al., 2017; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014). 
The cross-border Pan-African bank status (AFRICAN) captures the African origin of 
foreign banks; i.e. regional African or cross-border Pan-African banks versus international non-
African banks. The AFRICAN indicator takes the value of 1 when the bank is a regional African 
cross-border bank, and zero otherwise. We expect a positive relationship between Pan-African 
bank status and capital and risk. According to Léon (2016), the rapid expansion of regional Pan-
African banks in WAEMU region has increased competition in the sector. Higher competition 
may lead to more risk since these new comers will need to compete to gain costumers, and 
hence, they may be tempted to lend to less solvent clients. In addition, we expect the AFRICAN 
indicator to negatively impact the profitability of banks because intensive competition may 
generate lower profits for the banks. 
3.3.3 Control variables 
We use two types of control variables: bank characteristics; and macroeconomic or 
country-specific factors. 
Bank-specific factors: 
Bank-specific factors are used to control for bank idiosyncratic characteristics and banking 




- Loan-to-total assets (LA) is expected to be positively related to profitability and risk, as an 
increase in the bank’s loan portfolio will result in more interest income and more credit risk. 
The relationship between loan-to-assets and the capital ratio is mixed. Indeed, the loan-to-
assets ratio is an indicator of bank riskiness: The higher the ratio, the more the bank is 
exposed to higher defaults since its liquidity is low. Therefore, the moral hazard hypothesis 
(negative relationship) or the regulatory hypothesis (positive relationship) can hold as 
mentioned above.  
- Bank size (SIZE) is measured by the logarithm of total assets. We expect this variable to 
negatively impact the variation of bank capital and profitability (e.g., Jacques and Nigro, 
1997; Rime, 2001; Guidara et al., 2013, among others) and positively impact risk. The 
positive relationship between bank size and risk is supported by several theories. Firstly, 
according to the unstable banking hypothesis, large banks tend to engage more in risky 
activities that are financed with short-term debts. This behavior makes them more 
vulnerable to generalized liquidity shocks and market failures (e.g., Gennaioli et al., 2013; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 2010; Kashyap et al., 2002). Secondly, the too-big-to-fail hypothesis 
states that regulators are reluctant to unwind large banks; therefore, these banks tend to take-
on excessive risks in the expectation of government bailouts (e.g., Farhi and Tirole, 2012). 
Finally, according to the agency cost hypothesis, large banks that engage in multiple 
activities suffer from increased agency problems and poor corporate governance that can 
translate into systemic risk (e.g., Bolton et al., 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2007).  
 
Macroeconomic and institutional quality factors: 
Macroeconomic and institutional quality indicators are used to control for external 
factors. These variables are: 
- Income concentration ratio (CR3) is computed as the ratio of total net income of the three 
biggest banks divided by total net income of the country’s banking sector. This indicator is 
used to capture industrial concentration and competition in the banking sector. We expect 
the variable to positively impact bank profitability and risk (Beck et al., 2006) and capital 
through retaining earnings.  
- Output gap (OUTGAP) is used to capture the business cycle (demand side effect). It is 
calculated as the cyclical component of real gross domestic product (GDP) growth by 
applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter. We use this cyclical output gap instead of real GDP 




the relationship between the business cycle and bank capital is mixed. We will observe 
positive co-movement if this indicator is positively related to capital ratio (e.g., Guidara et 
al., 2013), and negative co-movement (e.g., Behn et al., 2016) otherwise. Moreover, 
according to economic intuition, we expect a positive relationship between the business 
cycle and bank risk and profitability.  
- Domestic credit to the economy (DCREDIT), measured by the ratio of total credit to the 
economy divided by total GDP, is used to control for the level of development of the 
country’s financial sector. An increase in DCREDIT may be viewed as an improvement in 
the level of financial development in the country, and presumably an increase in competition 
within the sector. As a result, we expect a negative relationship between this variable and 
profitability and capital, but a positive relationship with risk. DCREDIT can also be a 
measure of credit cycle, with a high value of this indicator being an indication of leverage 
build-up in the financial system, hence a signal for more risk accumulation in the banking 
sector, for example Boar et al. (2017) and Drehmann et al. (2011). 
- Real interest rate (INTEREST) is a proxy for the borrowing cost in the economy and is used 
in the model to control for the impact of the interest rate on bank lending. Higher borrowing 
costs to households and firms generate high profits for the bank but can also reduce loan 
demand. Therefore, the effect of INTEREST on performance is indeterminate. But, 
following Lee and Hsieh (2013), we except a positive effect of INTEREST on profitability 
and capital because loan distribution in developing economies is determined by supply side 
(Ndikumana, 2016), especially given that the WAEMU financial system is bank-based. 
Also, banks build capital by retaining earnings. In addition, we expect a negative 
relationship between INTEREST and bank risk since an increase in the central bank rate 
increases the real interest rate, while a restrictive monetary policy may reduce bank risk-
taking behavior. 
- Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (POLSTAB) measures perceptions of 
the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including 
terrorism. This variable is used to control for the institutional quality within the country. It 
is one of the indicators of the Worldwide Governance Indicators. A higher value of 
POLSTAB means lower political risk or higher quality of institutions. For example, the 
average for 2014 was 0.04 points; the highest value was 1.54 scored by peaceful and stable 
Liechtenstein and the lowest value was -2.76 scored by violent and war-torn Syria. A better 




which allows firms to adjust faster to their target capital structure (Öztekin and Flannery, 
2012) and, in the case of banks, to increase their lending (Haselmann, et al., 2010). 
Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between POLSTAB and bank capital (CAR) 
and between POLSTAB and profitability. With respect to risk, we expect both positive and 
negative relationship. Indeed, in an enabling institutional environment, we expect banks to 
have better internal corporate governance, which can reduce their risk exposure. At the same 
time, since we posit that bank loans increase with the quality of institutions, the banks’ risk 
exposure may increase due to the consequent increase in the sheer volume of bank loans.  
- REG2008: We add a dummy to capture the change of capital requirement in 2008. 
REG2008 takes the value of 1 after 2007 and zero before. According to the prudential 
framework in force since January 1st, 2000 (BCEAO, 2013), bank core capital must be at 
least equal to the statutory minimum capital. The minimum capital threshold was XOF 1 
billion from 2000 until end of 2007. It was raised to XOF 5 billion in September 2007 with 
effect from 2008 and was raised further to XOF 10 billion in March 2015, with a grace 
period, which allows banks to conform to this new standard by July 1st, 2017 at the latest 
(cf. Appendix A). These successive increases in the minimum capital level aim to promote 
a healthy and strong banking and financial system, which in turn, is expected to effectively 
contribute to the financing of economic development of WAEMU member States. We 
control for these changes. 
Table 2 gives a summary of the variables, their description and sources of data. Bank-
level data are hand-collected from the balance sheet reports of the banks, obtained from the 
Banking Commission of WAEMU, the banking sector regulatory arm of the Central Bank of 
the West African States (BCEAO). Macroeconomic and institutional quality data are obtained 
from the BCEAO and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) and Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) databases.  
3.4 Estimation techniques 
Our econometric model comprises a system of three equations. The presence of a lagged 
dependent variable in the empirical model suggests dynamic panel data estimation techniques. 
The lagged bank profitability, risk and capital variables are likely to be correlated with the error 
term; also, are the control variables (loans-to-assets ratio (LA), the bank size (SIZE), the 
concentration index (CR3), the domestic credit to the economy as a percentage of the GDP 
(DCREDIT) and the output gap (OUTGAP), although these variables are lagged in the 




of the equation. Hence, we use the two-step system GMM method suggested by Blundell and 
Bond (1998), which is a better method to deal with endogeneity and other econometric issues 
in this study. Since GMM is an instrumental variables method, we use the level and the first 
differences of the variables as instruments.  
Table 2  
Description of the variables 
This table presents the dependent variables and the explanatory variables in the three-equation system, 
their definitions, the abbreviations used in empirical results, and sources of observed data.     
Bank-specific variables 
CAR Capital-to-asset ratio BCEAO  
Z-SCORE Z-score used as risk measure BCEAO  
ROA Return on asset BCEAO  
ROE Return on equity BCEAO  
NIM Net interest margin divided by total asset BCEAO 
LLRL Loan loss reserves to total loans BCEAO  
LA Loans to total assets BCEAO 
SIZE Logarithm of total assets BCEAO 
FOREIGN 1 if foreigners own at least 50% of capital, 0 otherwise BCEAO 
AFRICAN 1 if pan-African bank status = yes, 0 otherwise  BCEAO 
Macroeconomic and institutional quality variables 
CR3 Concentration ratio: total net income of 3 biggest banks divided 
by total net income of all banks in the country 
BCEAO 
OUTGAP Output gap: Cyclical component of the logarithm of real GDP  World Bank’s WDI 
DCREDIT Domestic credit to the economy as percentage of GDP BCEAO 
INTEREST Real interest rate BCEAO 
POLSTAB Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism World Bank’s WGI 
REG2008 Dummy capturing change in minimum capital requirement in 
2008. It takes value of 1 after 2007 and zero before 
 
 
The indicator of the quality of the institutions, the real interest rate, the foreign dummy, 
the African dummy and the regulation dummy are assumed to be exogenous. These variables 
are used as standard instruments for the endogenous variables.  
Given that two-step GMM standard errors are biased, we employ the Windmeijer (2005) 
correction to obtain robust estimates of the variance-covariance matrix. We also conduct tests 
for the first- and second-order autocorrelation in the error term, and a Hansen Test of the validity 
of the over-identifying restriction in our model. While sensitive to the number of instruments, 
Hansen Test is robust to heteroskedasticity. In addition to the Hansen’s p-value, we report the 
number of instruments because instruments proliferation can overfit endogenous variables. We 
follow closely Roodman (2009a) and try to have reasonable Hansen’s p-value because “… the 





Year and country dummies are included in all specifications to account for time and 
country effects. We use forward orthogonal deviations to purge banks’ fixed effects (see 
Roodman 2009b; or Arellano and Bover, 1995). 
We use the three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation technique which is a full-
information estimation technique for robustness check. We use internal instruments – first 
difference of the variables – as it is not obvious to find external valid instruments. In the 
estimation, the system is just-identified. 
4. Data cleaning, univariate and correlation analysis  
This section explains how the data are cleaned before presenting summary statistics and 
correlation analysis. 
4.1 Data cleaning 
We hand-collect the data from annual balance sheet reports of banks operating in the WAEMU 
region for the period 2000 to 2014 as follows. Firstly, we convert the publicly available data 
from the PDF format (the only available format) into an Excel spreadsheet format. Secondly, 
we check for each bank entry if the information in the Excel spreadsheet format matches with 
the information originally contained in the PDF format. Thirdly, because we use a three-year 
window to calculate the components of the Z-score, banks with data for less than three years 
are automatically dropped. Fourthly, we winsorize all variables by using the (upper and lower) 
adjacent values (Tukey, 1977). Indeed, let 𝑥 represent a variable for which adjacent values are 
being calculated. Define 𝑥[25] and 𝑥[75] as the 25th and 75th percentiles of the variable 𝑥. The 
upper adjacent value of 𝑥 is given by 𝑥[75] + 1.5(𝑥[75] − 𝑥[25]) and the lower adjacent value is 
defined by 𝑥[25] − 1.5(𝑥[75] − 𝑥[25]). Any data greater (lower) than the upper (lower) adjacent 
value are considered outliers. This is a non-parametric way to clean the data based on Tukey’s 
procedure16. 
                                                 
16 To compare our results to the common practice as robustness check, we winsorize all variables at 1 percent 
level. The results of the comparisons are available upon request. The Tukey procedure leads to the same result – 
except for ROA – in terms of variation of the variables and sometimes reduces much better the variance, and 
therefore will best help us to mitigate the impact of outliers. In fact, the Tukey graphs of each winsorized variable 
at 1 percent show that all variables exhibit outliers expect for political stability and absence of violence 
(POLSTAB) and the banks’ size (SIZE). In other words, the common approach used in the literature – winsorizing 
at 1 percent level – does not clean all the outliers. For example, the winsorized variables at 1 percent contain severe 
outliers: 8% for ROA and CAR, 4% for Z-score, 3% for CR3 and 2% for output gap (OUTGAP) and real interest 
rate (INTEREST). These outliers can generate misleading conclusions when following the standard procedure in 





Summary statistics over the sample, 2000-2014 
This table reports the summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables of the system of 
three equations. The Q1, Q2 and Q3 are 25%, 50% (median) and 75% percentiles. The raw data for 
computing bank-specific variables were obtained from the Banking Commission of WAEMU, while the 
data for computing the rest of the variables were obtained from the BCEAO and the World Bank World 
Development Indicators and Worldwide Governance Indicators databases. Except for binary variables 
(FOREIGN and AFRICAN), the size of the banks and variables that lie between 0 and 1 (Z-score), all 
the other variables have been winsorized based on Tukey’s procedure.  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Q2 Q3 Max 
CAR 1293 0.09 0.07 -0.07 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.24 
ROA 1293 0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 
ROE 1293 0.11 0.26 -0.38 0.00 0.11 0.26 0.64 
NIM 1293 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.09 
Z-SCORE 1170 0.84 0.14 0.00 0.82 0.86 0.92 1.00 
LLRL 1293 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 
LA 1293 0.76 0.12 0.20 0.70 0.78 0.84 1.00 
FOREIGN 1293 0.72 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AFRICAN 1293 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
CR3 1293 0.45 0.17 0.08 0.33 0.40 0.57 0.73 
SIZE 1293 11.07 1.25 6.79 10.31 11.16 11.96 13.84 
DCREDIT 1293 0.18 0.06 0.07 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.30 
OUTGAP 1293 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 
INTEREST 1293 2.17 2.12 -1.84 1.31 2.54 3.44 6.32 
POLSTAB 1293 -0.54 0.74 -2.30 -1.16 -0.30 -0.02 0.74 
 
4.2 Univariate and correlation analysis 
Table 3 gives the summary statistics of the variables. Firstly, there is great heterogeneity 
in the sample banks. For example, the average value of capital is 9% but it lies between -7% 
and 24%. Some banks are undercapitalized and do not meet the minimum capital adequacy 
requirements, while others are overcapitalized, relative to the stipulated benchmarks by 
BCEAO as stated in Appendix A. Secondly, the median return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE) are 1% and 11%, respectively. The mean net interest margin is 3%. Thirdly, the 
mean loan loss provision of the sample is 1%. Fourthly, the proportion of foreign banks 
(FOREIGN) is 72% which means that only 28% of the banks are owned by the national private 
actors or by the public sector. The proportion of cross-border Pan-African banks (AFRICAN) is 
49%. This high proportion of foreign banks is consistent with Léon (2016), who provides an 
overview of the recent developments in the banking industry in WAEMU and shows the 
emergence, since the last decade, of cross-border banks from Africa. The high statistic also 
supports recent empirical studies, which highlight the expansion of cross-border banking in 





Difference test between LICs and LMIs subsamples, 2000-2014 
This table compares the means of the variables in the two subsamples: low income countries (LICs) and 
lower-middle income countries (LMIs). The raw data for computing bank-specific variables were 
obtained from the Banking Commission of WAEMU, while the data for computing the rest of the 
variables were obtained from the BCEAO and the World Bank World Development Indicators and 
Worldwide Governance Indicators databases. Comparison tests are performed using the t-test (with 
unequal variance). Superscripts ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
  Low income Lower-middle income Comparison test 
  Obs. Avg. Obs. Avg. Diff. P-Value 
CAR 794 0.087 499 0.074 0.012 0.264 
ROA 794 0.001 499 0.002 -0.001 0.680 
ROE 794 0.105 499 0.121 -0.016 0.271 
NIM 794 0.030 499 0.026 0.004*** 0.006 
Z-SCORE 723 0.818 447 0.882 -0.064*** 0.000 
LLRL 794 0.007 499 0.009 -0.001** 0.013 
LA 794 0.760 499 0.767 -0.007 0.297 
SIZE 794 10.876 499 11.371 -0.495*** 0.000 
CR3 794 0.500 499 0.372 0.127*** 0.000 
DCREDIT 794 0.172 499 0.201 -0.029*** 0.000 
OUTGAP 794 0.000 499 0.001 -0.001** 0.037 
INTEREST 794 2.133 499 2.217 -0.085 0.467 
POLSTAB 794 -0.262 499 -0.979 0.717*** 0.000 
 
Table 4 presents the difference test of the mean of the variables between the subsamples 
of LICs and LMICs. We observe significant differences between the two subsamples in terms 
of the bank characteristics NIM, Z-score, LLRL, SIZE, and the countries’ characteristics CR3, 
DCREDIT, OUTGAP and POLSTAB. The result seems to suggest that banks in LMICs take 
more credit risk, are bigger in size and are less concentrated than banks in LICs.  The high 
competition among banks in LMICs and the fact that banks in these countries grant more credit 
to the economy can explain their relative lower net-interest-margin. The lower value of political 
stability indicator (POLSTAB) for LMICs is due to a decade of political turmoil in Ivory Coast, 
which ended when the new elected Government took office in 2011.  
The high value of domestic credit to the economy (DCREDIT) in lower-middle income 
countries suggests that the differences observed among countries (LICs versus LMICs) is due 
partly to their level of financial sector development as the variable DCREDIT is usually used 
in the literature to measure financial sector development. As a matter of fact, since 1990, bank 
loans have been much higher in the two LMICs than in the other six LICs. The institutional 
background seems to play less role during the 2000-2014 period in the observed differences, 
since during the sample period, the institutional quality has been relatively low in Ivory Coast 




4 confirm the heterogeneity of the banks in our sample, in a seemingly homogenous regional 
block of eight countries that constitute the WAEMU.  
Table 5 presents correlations between any two variables. Consistent with theory, capital 
(CAR) is inversely and significantly correlated with the profitability (in terms of ROE) and with 
risk indicators (Z-score and LLRL). But, CAR is positively correlated with the other two 
profitability measures, namely ROA and NIM. The explanation is that with a capital increase, 
banks can lend more, thereby generating more interest income, hence increasing banks’ profits. 
The negative relation found between CAR and ROE is probably due to the scaling effect, where 
the marginal increase in the denominator (equity) in ROE is larger than that of the numerator 
(net earnings). Regarding the three measures of profitability, the correlation coefficient between 
ROA and ROE is relatively high, at 39.5%, while the correlation between ROE/ROA and NIM 
is positive, but relatively low (10 and 11.5%). The two risk indicators (Z-score and LLRL) are 
positively correlated with a low correlation coefficient of 6.8%. Overall, the correlation 
coefficients between the independent variables are not too high, as shown in Table 5 (less than 






Pair-wise correlation matrix 
This table reports the pair-wise correlation matrix for the dependent and explanatory variables of the system of three equations. The mnemonics used are: Z = 
Z-score, FOR = FOREIGN, AFRI = AFRICAN, RIR = INTEREST. The raw data for computing bank-specific variables were obtained from the Banking 
Commission of WAEMU, while the data for computing the rest of the variables were obtained from the BCEAO and the World Bank World Development 
Indicators and Worldwide Governance Indicators databases. Values in parentheses are p-values which reflect the significance of each correlation. Superscripts 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  CAR ROA ROE NIM Z LLRL LA FOR AFRI CR3 SIZE DCREDIT OUTGAP RIR POLSTAB 
CAR 1                               
ROA 0.175*** 1              
 (0.000)               
ROE -0.227*** 0.395*** 1             
 (0.000) (0.000)              
NIM 0.054* 0.115*** 0.100*** 1            
 (0.052) (0.000) (0.000)             
Z -0.183*** -0.198*** 0.004 -0.066** 1           
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.896) (0.024)            
LLRL -0.165*** -0.123*** -0.009 0.031 0.068** 1          
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.761) (0.270) (0.020)           
LA 0.043 0.089*** -0.027 0.197*** -0.002 -0.232*** 1         
 (0.120) (0.001) (0.340) (0.000) (0.960) (0.000)          
FOR -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 0.013 0.046 -0.100*** 0.091*** 1        
 (0.688) (0.651) (0.652) (0.650) (0.116) (0.000) (0.001)         
AFRI -0.031 -0.144*** -0.033 -0.011 0.048 -0.156*** -0.026 0.590*** 1       
 (0.269) (0.000) (0.237) (0.684) (0.101) (0.000) (0.349) (0.000)        
CR3 0.045 0.012 -0.053* -0.058** -0.179*** 0.003 -0.003 -0.012 0.002 1      
 (0.105) (0.669) (0.056) (0.036) (0.000) (0.925) (0.906) (0.667) (0.938)       
SIZE -0.126*** 0.425*** 0.275*** 0.024 -0.087*** 0.101*** -0.171*** -0.028 -0.171*** -0.218*** 1     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.389) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.309) (0.000) (0.000)      
DCREDIT -0.020 0.072*** 0.098*** -0.017 0.207*** -0.015 -0.092*** -0.023 0.062** -0.333*** 0.303*** 1    
 (0.463) (0.009) (0.000) (0.535) (0.000) (0.603) (0.001) (0.407) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000)     
OUTGAP -0.003 0.006 -0.002 -0.026 0.023 0.032 0.007 0.000 -0.002 0.056** 0.043 0.062** 1   
 (0.924) (0.842) (0.952) (0.347) (0.427) (0.255) (0.813) (0.989) (0.951) (0.044) (0.125) (0.027)    
RIR 0.021 0.071** 0.028 0.062** 0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.026 0.014 0.029 0.019 -0.002 1  
 (0.452) (0.011) (0.312) (0.027) (0.651) (0.694) (0.690) (0.642) (0.358) (0.622) (0.291) (0.493) (0.952)   
POLSTAB 0.053* -0.006 -0.052* -0.043 0.097*** -0.146*** 0.022 0.054* 0.154*** 0.205*** -0.100*** 0.171*** 0.008 0.083*** 1 





5. Econometric results and discussion 
To address our research questions, we first examine all banks together and then run the 
estimation for the different sub-panels separately using the simultaneous equations (4-6), stated 
above. Sub-panels are first built based on countries’ gross national income (GNI) per capita 
according to the World Bank classification in 2016. Based on this classification, the full sample 
is divided into two sub-panels: LICs (Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger and 
Togo) and LMICs (Ivory Coat and Senegal). Thereafter, we also build sub-samples based on 
ownership status of banks (foreign owned versus domestic owned) and on the Pan-African bank 
status (cross-border Pan-African banks versus foreign banks from outside Africa).  
5.1 Main results 
As mentioned above, we adopt the two-step generalized method of moments (2SGMM) 
estimation technique. Table 6 reports the estimation results. These results confirm the 
importance of setting the model in a dynamic way and justifies the use of the 2SGMM approach 
to overcome potential endogeneity issues. Moreover, the Hansen over-identification test does 
not reject the null hypothesis of correct specification, which means that our instruments are 
valid.  
The three main variables of interest (capital, profitability and risk) indicate evidence of 
strong persistence over time. Indeed, the coefficient of the lagged value of the dependent 
variable is negative and significant in all regressions. This stems from the partial adjustment 
framework presented in equation 3. The great heterogeneity across countries justifies the sub-
panel estimation and highlights specific results that we would not have found if we had 





Estimation of the system with ROA and Z-SCORE as profitability and risk indicators, respectively 
This table reports the estimation results for a three-equation system, with ROA and Z-score as profitability and risk indicators, respectively, allowing for cross-border Pan-
African bank status and foreign bank status. CAR is the capital-to-asset ratio. All the macro controls are lagged. Data for bank-specific variables were obtained from the Banking 
Commission of WAEMU, while the data for computing the rest of the variables were obtained from the BCEAO and the World Bank World Development Indicators and 
Worldwide Governance Indicators databases. The estimations are performed using the two-step generalized method of moments. We use forward orthogonal deviations to purge 
banks’ fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Superscripts ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  AFRICAN FOREIGN 
  Full Sample Lower-middle income Low income Full Sample Lower-middle income Low income 
  ΔROA ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔROA ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔROA ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔROA ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔROA ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔROA ΔRISK ΔCAR 
ROA(-1) -0.789***   -0.790***   -0.764***   -0.805***   -0.738***   -0.748***   
  (0.082)   (0.207)   (0.087)   (0.078)   (0.193)   (0.100)   
ΔROA  -0.187 0.718*  0.127 0.406**  0.474 0.232**  -0.156 0.949*  -0.073 0.347*  0.331 0.201** 
   (0.379) (0.400)  (0.198) (0.177)  (0.494) (0.090)  (0.399) (0.559)  (0.048) (0.177)  (0.576) (0.089) 
RISK(-1)  -0.608***   -0.769***   -0.580***   -0.603***   -0.727***   -0.568***  
   (0.073)   (0.094)   (0.099)   (0.073)   (0.107)   (0.090)  
ΔRISK -0.006  0.002 -0.001  0.005 -0.007  0.003 -0.005  0.007 -0.000  -0.008 -0.006  0.003 
  (0.005)  (0.013) (0.008)  (0.014) (0.004)  (0.012) (0.005)  (0.013) (0.007)  (0.016) (0.004)  (0.013) 
CAR(-1)   -0.174**   -0.204*   -0.219***   -0.179**   -0.232*   -0.218*** 
    (0.076)   (0.107)   (0.067)   (0.082)   (0.121)   (0.063) 
ΔCAR 0.082*** 0.032  0.100* -0.056  0.047** 0.002  0.080*** 0.038  0.111** 0.014  0.046* 0.035  
  (0.018) (0.076)  (0.052) (0.062)  (0.021) (0.127)  (0.017) (0.080)  (0.050) (0.042)  (0.023) (0.153)  
AFRICAN -0.004 -0.020 -0.036* 0.023 -0.022 -0.003 0.005 0.007 0.022          
  (0.006) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.023) (0.028) (0.006) (0.029) (0.020)          
FOREIGN          -0.022** -0.001 -0.069* 0.016 0.017 0.001 -0.001 0.033 0.014 
           (0.009) (0.032) (0.040) (0.016) (0.023) (0.042) (0.009) (0.027) (0.017) 
LA 0.024 -0.036 -0.048 -0.000 0.015 -0.289* 0.028 -0.003 0.013 0.013 -0.021 -0.023 -0.011 0.076 -0.215** 0.029 0.013 0.004 
  (0.016) (0.050) (0.044) (0.016) (0.049) (0.156) (0.022) (0.066) (0.044) (0.019) (0.050) (0.055) (0.035) (0.067) (0.105) (0.025) (0.067) (0.039) 
SIZE 0.008** -0.028*** -0.003 0.016* -0.021* 0.029 0.009*** -0.024** 0.006 0.006 -0.023** 0.007 0.012* -0.015** 0.018 0.008*** -0.026** 0.004 
  (0.003) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.029) (0.003) (0.011) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.018) (0.003) (0.010) (0.007) 
CR3 -0.011 -0.057* -0.171** 0.099* 0.094 -0.069 0.002 -0.009 -0.022 -0.011 -0.061* -0.177** 0.065 0.061 -0.053 0.001 -0.019 -0.024 
  (0.008) (0.034) (0.070) (0.055) (0.109) (0.245) (0.008) (0.046) (0.015) (0.009) (0.035) (0.077) (0.067) (0.071) (0.367) (0.008) (0.044) (0.015) 
OUTGAP 0.146** 0.592** 0.327* 0.352 0.474 0.745 0.010 0.784* 0.784*** 0.188*** 0.557** 0.212 0.270 0.166 -2.424 0.006 0.903** 0.781*** 
  (0.072) (0.264) (0.186) (0.418) (0.514) (1.973) (0.062) (0.419) (0.247) (0.071) (0.276) (0.219) (0.366) (0.890) (2.485) (0.065) (0.412) (0.251) 
INTEREST -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.008 -0.008 -0.001* -0.001 0.003 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.012) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.014) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) 
POLSTAB -0.008*** 0.008 -0.002 -0.020 -0.021 -0.010 -0.006 0.026* -0.015** -0.009*** 0.011 -0.002 -0.016 -0.010 0.090 -0.005 0.025* -0.014** 
  (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.018) (0.015) (0.070) (0.003) (0.014) (0.006) (0.003) (0.009) (0.006) (0.017) (0.030) (0.118) (0.004) (0.013) (0.007) 
DCREDIT -0.091 -0.071 -0.033 -0.185 0.333 -0.681 -0.089* -0.097 -0.128 -0.098* -0.086 0.002 -0.199 -0.018 1.679 -0.086 -0.160 -0.132 
  (0.056) (0.216) (0.104) (0.232) (0.398) (1.739) (0.052) (0.202) (0.086) (0.056) (0.210) (0.129) (0.210) (0.538) (2.316) (0.056) (0.213) (0.096) 
REG2008 -0.082* 0.016 0.024 -0.213 0.756*** 0.046 -0.010* 0.761*** -0.038 -0.028 0.836*** 0.013 -0.003 0.679*** -0.031 -0.099* 0.759*** 0.004 
  (0.042) (0.023) (0.018) (0.137) (0.216) (0.136) (0.006) (0.224) (0.103) (0.054) (0.162) (0.015) (0.024) (0.153) (0.076) (0.051) (0.195) (0.095) 
Constant 0.000 0.909*** 0.159 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.100** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.064 -0.147 0.000 -0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.170) (0.135) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.138) (0.091) (0.000) (0.352) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,048 1,048 1,048 398 398 398 650 650 650 1,048 1,048 1,048 398 398 398 650 650 650 
Number of banks 110 110 110 43 43 43 67 67 67 110 110 110 43 43 43 67 67 67 
Number of instruments 42 56 44 54 44 50 51 54 66 42 56 41 54 50 54 51 54 66 
AR1 Residual Test 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.015 0.095 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.010 0.094 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.002 
AR2 Residual Test 0.496 0.285 0.870 0.621 0.982 0.177 0.169 0.213 0.674 0.649 0.302 0.697 0.584 0.733 0.134 0.169 0.237 0.654 




5.1.1 How sensitive is bank profitability to changes in bank capital ratio in WAEMU? 
We first focus on the return on assets (ROA) as our main measure of bank profitability. 
The results in Table 6 show that there is a persistence of profitability over time. Capital has a 
positive and significant impact on bank performance as in Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014), 
Munyambonera (2013), Iannota et al. (2007) and Goddard et al. (2004). Intuitively, a bank that 
holds a relatively high level of capital can expand its loans and increase its income from loans 
and is therefore likely to earn high profits. The impact of capital on profitability seems somehow 
to be somewhat higher in LMICs (+0.10) than in LICs (+0.05), with one percentage point 
increase in bank capital ratio leading to 10 and 5 basis points increase in profitability in LMICs 
and LICs, respectively. These results are consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 1. It may 
be argued that banks in relatively rich economies (LMICs in WAEMU) are more efficient than 
those in LICs in the region because they can generate more profits with relatively less capital 
compare to their low-income peers.  
Moreover, in the regression with CAR as dependent variable, ROA has a positive and 
significant impact on capital, confirming the endogeneity of the relationship between the two 
variables (ROA and CAR). Indeed, when a bank is profitable, it can increase its capital ratio 
through retained earnings, which in turn generates more lending activities and hence more 
profits.  
5.1.2 How sensitive is bank risk-taking to changes in bank capital ratio in WAEMU? 
The existing literature found mixed results with respect to the impact of variations in bank 
capital ratio on bank risk-taking behaviour. For example, while Altunbas et al. (2007) found a 
positive relationship between capital and risk, consistent with the regulatory hypothesis which 
posits that banks increase their capital with an increase in risk-taking, other researchers instead 
found support for the moral hazard hypothesis, which stipulates that banks tend to increase 
(decrease) their risk positions as capital declines (increases). This latter negative relationship 
between capital and risk may be the consequence of regulation (Guidara et al.; 2013), when 
banks’ leverage and risk positions are already high. 
In Table 6, we observe a weak positive relation between CAR and the Z-score especially 
in low income countries. This non-significant positive relationship between risk and capital 
dismisses the moral hazard hypothesis and supports the regulatory hypothesis. The results are 
generally consistent with our Hypothesis 2. The evidence suggests that with capital increase, 




(risk-return trade-off). Moreover, we observe that the increase in the minimum capital 
requirement in 2008, captured by the dummy REG2008 in the regressions, had an increasing 
effect on bank risk and a decreasing effect on bank profitability. These effects are more 
pronounced in LICs. 
5.1.3 What is the relationship between bank capital and the business cycle in WAEMU?  
Although we analyze the impact of capital variations on bank risk-taking and bank 
profitability, still the three variables (capital, profit and risk) are endogenous and change 
simultaneously, i.e. risk and profitability also impact on capital. The significant coefficient of 
ROA in the capital ratio equation given in Table 6 confirms the above results, i.e. positive 
relationship between profit and capital across countries, as predicted in Hypothesis 1. These 
results are consistent with earlier findings by Iannota et al. (2007). The positive impact of the 
profitability measure ROA on capital is more pronounced for LMICs. 
In terms of the impact of the business cycle on bank capital, Fig. 1 plots the evolution 
of the aggregate capital ratio and output gap for each of the eight WAEMU countries. For LICs, 
we can see clearly from the graphs in Fig. 1 that the output gap and the aggregate banking sector 
capital ratio co-move positively, while for the remaining two LMICs, the direction of co-
movement of their output gap and banking sector capital ratio is unclear. The results from 
regression analysis, reported in Table 6, show that banks accumulate more capital in expansion 
periods. However, when the analysis is conducted with respect to the countries’ income level, 
we find that banks accumulate more capital during expansions (high value of output gap) in 
LICs. In LMICs, bank capital accumulation remains insensitive to variations in the business 
cycle.  
Hence, bank capital positions tend to co-move positively with the business cycle in LICs 
as opposed to LMICs. This capital adjustment behavior with the business cycle in LICs is 
interpreted as inducing countercyclical lending in nature, meaning that banks accumulate more 
capital buffer during expansion periods and use these additional buffers to support their credit 
activities during recessions when risk is high and capital scarce. This finding is consistent with 
the predictions of Hypothesis 3. As we can see in Fig. 1, the capital accumulation behavior 
depends on the specificity of the country where the bank operates. This is consistent with Jokipii 
and Milne (2008) who find that the cyclical behavior of bank capital varies according to the 







Fig. 1. Evolution of capital ratio and output gap for the WAEMU countries 
The graphs in this figure plot the evolution of bank capital ratio and the output gap for each of the eight WAEMU countries. On each graph, the left axis shows the values of 
capital (CAR) and right axis shows the values of output gap (OUTGAP). Solid lines are CAR and dashed lines are OUTGAP. The raw data for computing bank capital ratios 


























































































































































































Moreover, the increase in the minimum capital requirement in 2008 had a non-
significant effect on bank capital ratio level, but had an increasing effect on bank risk and a 
decreasing effect on bank profitability17. It is to be noted, however, that the increase in the 
minimum capital requirement was not followed by an increase in the minimum regulatory 
capital adequacy ratio (which remains at 8%), therefore, it looks like banks adjusted upward 
their assets in the expectation of minimum capital increase in 2008, which compensates for the 
capital increase, hence neutralizing the overall impact on the capital ratio. 
Consistent with economic intuition, profit and risk increase altogether with positive 
variations in the business cycles as banks become highly levered during economic booms. 
Hence, in the spirit of the current Basel III regulations, banks need to constitute enough capital 
buffers during economic expansions to face possible future credit portfolio failures during 
economic downturns, which explains the behavior followed by banks in low income WAEMU 
countries. 
5.1.4 Does bank ownership status matter? 
We are interested in establishing whether bank ownership structure (foreign versus 
domestic) matters in determining bank capital, risk and profitability. We also investigate 
whether the presence of Pan-African cross-border banks impacts bank capital, risk and 
profitability. To achieve our objectives, we first compute the mean of the variables by 
subsample: foreign-owned banks versus domestically-owned banks, and cross-border Pan-
African banks versus non-Pan-African banks. Table 7 presents the comparison tests between 
the mean values of the variables in the subsamples, namely foreign-owned banks versus 
domestically owned banks (Panel A), as well as cross-border Pan-African banks versus non-
Pan-African banks (Panel B). We observe that foreign-owned banks lend more and have less 
loan loss reserves ratio as opposed to domestically-owned banks, whereas Pan-African cross-
border banks are less profitable, have less loan loss reserves and are smaller in size than their 
non-Pan-African counterparts.  
Furthermore, the econometric results presented in Table 6 above show that foreign bank 
presence drive down profit (measured by ROA) and capital ratio. When we look at the risk 
                                                 
17 The dummy REG2008 could capture, among other, the financial crisis. First, as mentioned in the introduction, 
the banking sector of the WAEMU region was less affected by the 2007-2009 financial turmoil. An analysis of the 
impact of the 2008 global financial crisis on the WAEMU concludes that “the overall impact of the crisis on the 
WAEMU was relatively moderate compared to other regions…” (International Monetary Fund, African 
Department, 2012, page 35). Second, in the regressions, we control for country-year fixed effects that should 
absorb global factors affecting the relationships estimated in the paper. Therefore, we think that the risk of mis-




variable (in Table 7), we notice that the level of credit risk (measured by loan loss reserves 
ratio) taken by foreign-owned banks is lower than the risk taken by domestic banks. These 
results are consistent with the findings of Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014). It seems that 
domestic banks take too much risk when granting loans. One possible explanation is that 
foreign-owned banks, particularly French banks, are usually the oldest in many cases, domestic 
banks need more flexibility to attract some customers of the foreign-owned banks and therefore, 
they are lax when granting credit.  
Overall, the effects of foreign bank ownership on bank capital, risk and profitability in 
LICs and LMICs in WAEMU region is not so clear-cut. The only clear evidence is that foreign 
bank ownership is associated with a decrease in both profit and capital ratio in the overall 
banking sector. 
The results reported in Table 6 show that Pan-African cross-border banks tend to reduce 
the capital ratio in the overall banking sector. Although from the regression analysis, there is 
no evidence to support the effect of Pan-African banks presence on bank risk and profit in the 
full WAEMU sample, or in the LMICs or their low-income peers, the comparative analysis of 
Table 7 indicates that cross-border Pan-African banks have less loan loss reserves and are less 
profitable than their non-Pan-African peers. Overall, cross-border Pan-African banks do matter 
in the WAEMU countries; their presence seems to reduce profit, loan loss reserves and the 
capital ratio in the overall banking sector. 
As further analysis on the role of the key foreign banks, Table 8 gives an overview of 
the distribution of foreign banks headquarters in the WAEMU region. Cross-border banks 
operating in WAEMU countries are mainly from France (outside Africa), Libya, Nigeria and 
Morocco (Pan-African banks). Although Morocco represents a relatively smaller percentage of 
the sample relative to the other key big players (France, Libya and Nigeria), its penetration into 





Comparison test results for the subsamples of foreign versus pan-African ownership, 2000-2014 
This table compares the mean values of variables in the subsamples of foreign versus non-foreign owned 
banks (Panel A) and subsamples of cross-border pan-African banks versus non- pan-African banks 
(Panel B). The raw data for computing bank-specific variables were obtained from the Banking 
Commission of WAEMU, while the data for computing the rest of the variables were obtained from the 
BCEAO and the World Bank World Development Indicators and Worldwide Governance Indicators 
databases. Comparison tests are performed using the t-test (with unequal variance). Superscripts ***, 
** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Foreign ownership 
  Non-foreign owned banks Foreign owned banks Comparison test 
  Obs. Avg. Obs. Avg. Diff. P-Value 
CAR 365 0.085 928 0.081 0.005 0.699 
ROA 365 0.002 928 0.001 0.001 0.651 
ROE 365 0.116 928 0.109 0.007 0.653 
NIM 365 0.028 928 0.029 -0.001 0.668 
Z-SCORE 330 0.832 840 0.846 -0.014 0.128 
LLRL 365 0.009 928 0.007 0.002*** 0.001 
LA 365 0.747 928 0.769 -0.022*** 0.002 
SIZE 365 11.124 928 11.045 0.079 0.291 
CR3 365 0.454 928 0.449 0.004 0.677 
DCREDIT 365 0.185 928 0.182 0.003 0.395 
OUTGAP 365 0.000 928 0.000 0.000 0.989 
INTEREST 365 2.209 928 2.148 0.061 0.634 
POLSTAB 365 -0.603 928 - 0.514 -0.090* 0.055 
 
Panel B: Pan-African banks 
  Non- pan-African banks pan-African banks Comparison test 
  Obs. Avg. Obs. Avg. Diff. P-Value 
CAR 657 0.088 636 0.076 0.012 0.270 
ROA 657 0.005 636 -0.002 0.007*** 0.000 
ROE 657 0.120 636 0.102 0.017 0.238 
NIM 657 0.029 636 0.028 0.001 0.683 
Z-SCORE 597 0.836 573 0.849 -0.013 0.101 
LLRL 657 0.009 636 0.006 0.003*** 0.000 
LA 657 0.765 636 0.760 0.006 0.348 
SIZE 657 11.278 636 10.850 0.428*** 0.000 
CR3 657 0.450 636 0.451 -0.001 0.937 
DCREDIT 657 0.180 636 0.187 -0.007** 0.026 
OUTGAP 657 0.000 636 0.000 0.000 0.951 
INTEREST 657 2.219 636 2.110 0.109 0.358 









Country of origin for headquarters of foreign banks operating in WAEMU countries, 2000-2014 
This table displays the headquarters of foreign banks in the WAEMU. The raw data for computing bank-specific variables were obtained from the 
Banking Commission of WAEMU. 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total Percent 
Belgium 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1    26 2.80 
Burkina Faso              1 1 2 0.22 
Cameroon            1 1 1 1 4 0.43 
China  1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13 1.40 
France 10 10 10 11 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 145 15.63 
Gabon            2 2 2 2 8 0.86 
Libya 4 4 4 5 9 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 123 13.25 
Mali 6 7 7 7 7 7 8 9 9 9 10 9 10 10 10 125 13.47 
Mauritania   1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1.19 
Morocco       1  2 4 4 5 4 5 5 30 3.23 
Nigeria 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 7 8 8 10 11 11 11 84 9.05 
Saudi Arabia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15 1.62 
Switzerland 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 2     26 2.80 
Togo 8 8 8 8 8 16 23 23 24 24 23 24 25 25 24 271 29.20 
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14 1.51 
United States 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 31 3.34 






We conduct additional comparative tests between the mean values of variables for the 
main countries of origin of foreign banks: outside Africa (France) and Africa excluding 
WAEMU (Libya, Morocco and Nigeria). The results reported in Table 9 show that cross-border 
Pan-African banks from Libya, Morocco and Nigeria are less profitable and less stable (in terms 
of Z-score measure) compared to international foreign banks with headquarters in France. 
Moreover, French banks, on average, lend more, hold more loan loss provision, and are bigger 
in size than their counterparts cross border banks from Libya, Morocco and Nigeria. This 
confirms our argument that banks with headquarters in France are usually the oldest in many 
cases in this Francophone region of West Africa. Therefore, they are much bigger in size, have 
a larger loan portfolio, are more profitable and bear less overall risk (measured by Z-score). 
Consequently, the overall finding here supports our Hypothesis 4, indicating that cross-border 
Pan-African banks presence increases risk in the WAEMU banking system. 
5.2 Estimation results for the effects of other control variables 
Firstly, the income concentration variable, a proxy for banking sector competition 
within a country, has a significant decreasing effect on bank capital and risk in the full sample 
and significant positive effect on profitability in lower-middle income countries. In lower-
middle income WAEMU countries, higher value of income concentration increases profitability 
(ROA). This result for lower-middle income countries suggests that income concentration, 
analogous to market concentration, increases profitability of commercial banks. In low income 
WAEMU countries, however, the income concentration has a non-significant impact on 
profitability. 
Secondly, the effect of real interest rate is mixed. It is negatively (positively) related to 
performance in low income (lower-middle income) countries, but not significant in all 
regressions. This confirms the uncertain impact of real interest rate on performance raised in 
subsection 3.3.3. It is found that real interest rates have no significant impact on bank capital 
as well.  
Thirdly, the results for the quality of institutions (or political stability) variable are not 
clear-cut. Most regressions generate non-significant coefficients between the quality of 
institutions and bank profitability, and in one or two cases where the coefficients are significant, 
they are negatively signed, contrary to the expected positive relationship. Overall, according to 
the results, political stability has a negative significant impact on bank profitability and non-





Comparison test results for the subsamples of main origin of foreign banks headquarters: outside 
Africa versus Africa, 2000-2014 
This table compares the mean values of the variables in the subsamples of foreign banks with 
headquarters in France versus Africa (Libya, Morocco and Nigeria). The raw data for computing bank-
specific variables were obtained from the Banking Commission of WAEMU, while the data for 
computing the rest of the variables were obtained from the BCEAO and the World Bank World 
Development Indicators and Worldwide Governance Indicators databases. Comparison test are 
performed using the t-test (with unequal variance). Superscripts ***, ** and * denote significance at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  
Outside Africa Africa 
Comparison test 
(France) (Libya, Morocco and Nigeria) 
  Obs. Avg. Obs. Avg. Diff. P-Value 
CAR 145 0.094 237 0.101 -0.007 0.536 
ROA 145 0.013 237 -0.006 0.019*** 0.000 
ROE 145 0.161 237 0.016 0.145*** 0.000 
NIM 145 0.032 237 0.027 0.004* 0.085 
Z-SCORE 134 0.833 213 0.876 -0.044*** 0.002 
LLRL 145 0.012 237 0.009 0.003*** 0.004 
LA 145 0.793 237 0.739 0.054*** 0.000 
SIZE 145 11.845 237 10.852 0.993*** 0.000 
CR3 145 0.412 237 0.423 -0.011 0.498 
DCREDIT 145 0.188 237 0.196 -0.008 0.143 
OUTGAP 145 0.001 237 0.000 0.000 0.775 
INTEREST 145 2.197 237 2.170 0.027 0.903 
POLSTAB 145 -0.771 237 -0.335 -0.437*** 0.000 
 
Fourthly, as expected, domestic credit to the economy (DCREDIT) negatively impacts 
profitability in WAEMU countries in all regressions, but the coefficient is not always 
significant. Moreover, its coefficients for risk and capital are not significant. This result may 
indicate that the market in which banks operate is not saturated. Indeed, WAEMU countries are 
small countries in which firms and households have a critical unmet need of financing. An 
increase in credit to the economy will not automatically drop profitability of banks. Intuitively, 
an increase in credit to the economy may come from more lending by banks, hence asset 
increase, while at the same time capital increases.  
Fifthly, bank size (SIZE) has a significant positive impact on profit and a negative 
impact on risk. Its impact on capital is positive for both LICs and LMICs, but not significant. 
Intuitively, big banks (mainly French banks) in the region are relatively more efficient than 
small banks in their income generation process and bear relatively less risk. 
Finally, as expected, loan-to-asset ratio (LA) has a negative significant impact on the 
capital ratio variation in lower-middle income countries, but the coefficient is not significant in 




5.3 Robustness checks 
We check if the previous regression results are sensitive to the metric used to proxy 
profitability and risk. We use two other measures of profitability ROE and NIM and one other 
measure of risk LLRL to study the robustness of the regression results. Table 10 and Table 11 
report the estimation results for the three-equation system when we use NIM and ROE as 
measure of profitability, respectively. In these two tables, the risk measure is Z-score. As regard 
to profitability, we find that capital is not significantly related to these alternative bank 
profitability measures (NIM and ROE) and risk in both tables. However, NIM has a positive 
(non-significant) impact on capital ratio in all regressions with CAR as dependent variable 
(Table 10). For the profitability measure ROE, in Table 11, capital does not have a significant 
impact on profit and risk, although its coefficient is negative in all the profit equations. This is 
also confirmed by the significant negative impact of ROE on capital ratio. These findings are 










= 𝑅𝑂𝐸 × CAR, 
From the decomposition, it can be argued that an increase in capital ratio is due to equity 
increasing marginally faster than assets, hence causing a decrease on the return on equity 
(ROE). Therefore, ROE can decrease while at the same time ROA increases, which seems to 
be the case here. However, although assets may increase at a slower pace than equity, the 
marginal increase in asset can come from very risky loans, which may explain the positive 
impact of capital increase on risk.  
In both tables (10 and 11), the positive co-movement between business cycles variations 
and capital ratio in low income countries is confirmed. Moreover, in Table 10, the increase in 
the minimum capital requirement in 2008 had an increasing effect on bank capital ratio in low 
income countries and increasing effect on risk in the overall banking system, with more 
pronounced effect in low income countries. For the effect of cross-border banking, the results 
are not clear-cut. Finally, the control variables have the expected signs and confirm our previous 
findings. Overall, these results are similar as before. Hence, the results are robust to the three 





Estimation of the system with NIM as profitability measure 
This table reports the estimation results for three-equation system, with NIM as profitability measure, allowing for pan-African bank status and foreign bank ownership structure. 
NIM and Z-score are profitability and risk indicators, respectively. CAR is the capital-to-asset ratio. All the macro controls are lagged. The raw data for computing bank-specific 
variables were obtained from the Banking Commission of WAEMU, while the data for computing the rest of the variables were obtained from the BCEAO and the World Bank 
World Development Indicators and Worldwide Governance Indicators databases. The estimations are performed using the two-step generalized method of moments. We use 
forward orthogonal deviations to purge banks’ fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Superscripts ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
  AFRICAN FOREIGN 
  Full Sample Lower-middle income Low income Full Sample Lower-middle income Low income 
  ΔNIM ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔNIM ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔNIM ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔNIM ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔNIM ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔNIM ΔRISK ΔCAR 
NIM(-1) -0.564***   -0.621***   -0.519***   -0.592***   -0.640***   -0.297**   
  (0.100)   (0.182)   (0.087)   (0.087)   (0.182)   (0.122)   
ΔNIM  -0.007 0.028  -0.054 0.889  0.086 0.061  -0.015 0.005  -0.052 0.127  0.066 0.010 
   (0.098) (0.068)  (0.514) (0.602)  (0.211) (0.086)  (0.132) (0.078)  (0.536) (0.181)  (0.164) (0.127) 
RISK(-1)  -0.631***   -0.735***   -0.569***   -0.583***   -0.744***   -0.601***  
   (0.066)   (0.101)   (0.094)   (0.107)   (0.100)   (0.091)  
ΔRISK -0.002  0.001 0.026  -0.004 0.027*  0.000 -0.003  -0.000 0.012  -0.097 0.041  -0.004 
  (0.006)  (0.008) (0.052)  (0.037) (0.015)  (0.009) (0.004)  (0.008) (0.035)  (0.224) (0.028)  (0.011) 
CAR(-1)   -0.209***   -0.353*   -0.194***   -0.217***   -0.324   -0.259** 
    (0.059)   (0.186)   (0.065)   (0.076)   (0.226)   (0.107) 
ΔCAR -0.017 0.055  0.019 -0.019  0.005 0.078  0.017 0.013  0.015 0.000  -0.027 0.058  
  (0.025) (0.087)  (0.024) (0.045)  (0.038) (0.105)  (0.030) (0.081)  (0.027) (0.032)  (0.067) (0.104)  
AFRICAN 0.041* -0.039 -0.014 0.016 0.003 -0.026 -0.014 0.019 0.008          
  (0.023) (0.030) (0.021) (0.012) (0.020) (0.052) (0.011) (0.027) (0.016)          
FOREIGN          0.004 0.028* 0.019 0.024 0.005 0.004 -0.008 0.012 0.044 
           (0.008) (0.016) (0.028) (0.019) (0.014) (0.084) (0.011) (0.030) (0.058) 
LA 0.003 0.171 -0.067* 0.054* 0.020 -0.323* -0.006 -0.011 -0.020 0.060 -0.012 -0.202* 0.076** 0.016 -0.171 -0.008 -0.034 0.049 
  (0.057) (0.114) (0.040) (0.031) (0.050) (0.172) (0.029) (0.065) (0.059) (0.048) (0.055) (0.104) (0.037) (0.038) (0.150) (0.017) (0.077) (0.057) 
SIZE 0.001 -0.022* -0.001 0.012 -0.014** 0.010 -0.005** -0.024** 0.002 0.003 -0.018** 0.003 0.009** -0.014** 0.011 -0.004* -0.031*** 0.004 
  (0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.022) (0.002) (0.011) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.021) (0.002) (0.010) (0.011) 
CR3 -0.077 -0.020 -0.027* -0.054 0.061 0.530 0.012 -0.002 -0.031** 0.050* -0.042 -0.039** -0.010 0.042 0.540 0.009 -0.030 -0.041 
  (0.050) (0.028) (0.016) (0.043) (0.086) (0.496) (0.007) (0.038) (0.013) (0.026) (0.036) (0.019) (0.051) (0.080) (0.789) (0.010) (0.033) (0.030) 
OUTGAP 0.079 1.009* 0.343 -0.593* 0.018 -2.369 0.170** 0.703* 0.289** -0.170 0.676* 0.168 -0.029 -0.106 -1.768 0.185** 0.942** 0.853** 
  (0.468) (0.509) (0.212) (0.350) (0.638) (2.412) (0.066) (0.381) (0.112) (0.147) (0.341) (0.171) (0.475) (0.516) (2.991) (0.079) (0.382) (0.366) 
INTEREST 0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.005 0.016 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.004** 0.002 -0.003 -0.000 0.003 0.020 -0.000 -0.002 0.010 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.031) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.041) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009) 
POLSTAB -0.009 0.016 -0.002 0.018 -0.002 0.279* 0.000 0.026** -0.006 0.016 0.011 0.006 0.004 -0.001 0.203 -0.002 0.020* -0.035 
  (0.018) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.023) (0.145) (0.003) (0.013) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.019) (0.271) (0.002) (0.011) (0.023) 
DCREDIT -0.001 -0.458* -0.026 0.095 0.104 4.982** 0.067 -0.093 -0.016 0.297* -0.275 0.085 -0.075 0.075 3.492 0.040 -0.231 -0.254* 
  (0.262) (0.244) (0.117) (0.166) (0.343) (2.325) (0.050) (0.199) (0.077) (0.173) (0.267) (0.215) (0.233) (0.318) (3.897) (0.058) (0.202) (0.150) 
REG2008 0.013 0.778*** 0.103 -0.130 0.000 -0.352 0.065* 0.750*** 0.014* -0.150* 0.763*** -0.009 0.041*** 0.025 -0.409 -0.039*** 0.956*** 0.029 
  (0.115) (0.187) (0.121) (0.088) (0.000) (0.490) (0.038) (0.196) (0.008) (0.078) (0.171) (0.013) (0.012) (0.038) (0.579) (0.010) (0.204) (0.053) 
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.119 -0.185*** 0.000 0.000 0.091** 0.000 -0.070 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.128) (0.000) (0.000) (0.135) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (0.184) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,048 1,048 1,048 398 398 398 650 650 650 1,048 1,048 1,048 398 398 398 650 650 650 
Number of banks 110 110 110 43 43 43 67 67 67 110 110 110 43 43 43 67 67 67 
Number of instruments 47 97 69 54 46 55 73 62 54 56 53 56 49 46 55 48 73 46 
AR1 Residual Test 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.010 0.086 0.091 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.008 0.096 0.057 0.001 0.006 0.001 
AR2 Residual Test 0.621 0.256 0.901 0.154 0.738 0.441 0.408 0.204 0.463 0.104 0.366 0.805 0.104 0.759 0.399 0.482 0.186 0.994 






Estimation of the system with ROE as profitability measure 
This table reports the estimation results for three-equation system, with ROE as profitability measure, allowing for pan-African bank status and bank ownership structure. ROE 
and Z-score are profitability and risk indicators, respectively. CAR is the capital-to-asset ratio. All the macro controls are lagged. The raw data for computing bank-specific 
variables were obtained from the Banking Commission of WAEMU, while the data for computing the rest of the variables were obtained from the BCEAO and the World Bank 
World Development Indicators and Worldwide Governance Indicators databases. The estimations are performed using the two-step generalized method of moments estimation 
technique. We use forward orthogonal deviations to purge banks’ fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Superscripts ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
  AFRICAN FOREIGN 
  Full Sample Lower-middle income Low income Full Sample Lower-middle income Low income 
  ΔROE ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔROE ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔROE ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔROE ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔROE ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔROE ΔRISK ΔCAR 
ROE(-1) -0.898***   -0.991***   -0.787***   -0.848***   -1.059***   -0.764***   
  (0.075)   (0.118)   (0.085)   (0.063)   (0.118)   (0.075)   
ΔROE  0.005 -0.026***  0.004 -0.021**  0.004 -0.028**  -0.005 -0.025***  0.003 -0.021**  0.005 -0.026*** 
   (0.006) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.010)  (0.017) (0.011)  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.010)  (0.007) (0.009) 
RISK(-1)  -0.617***   -0.745***   -0.664***   -0.628***   -0.732***   -0.577***  
   (0.063)   (0.091)   (0.099)   (0.124)   (0.112)   (0.086)  
ΔRISK -0.076  -0.000 0.035  -0.005 -0.012  0.007 -0.047  -0.002 -0.003  -0.004 -0.071**  -0.001 
  (0.048)  (0.009) (0.132)  (0.008) (0.079)  (0.016) (0.042)  (0.009) (0.111)  (0.015) (0.032)  (0.013) 
CAR(-1)   -0.229***   -0.257**   -0.273***   -0.232***   -0.214*   -0.255*** 
    (0.084)   (0.116)   (0.083)   (0.070)   (0.109)   (0.078) 
ΔCAR -0.217 0.104  -0.505 -0.012  -0.105 0.215  -0.149 -0.083  -0.576 -0.024  -0.403 0.066  
  (0.368) (0.092)  (0.532) (0.047)  (0.402) (0.252)  (0.307) (0.154)  (0.807) (0.052)  (0.295) (0.100)  
AFRICAN 0.521*** -0.039 0.031 0.111 -0.011 -0.000 0.435 -0.009 0.025          
  (0.197) (0.030) (0.025) (0.122) (0.027) (0.011) (0.294) (0.039) (0.025)          
FOREIGN          -0.095 0.014 0.050* -0.104 0.007 0.017 -0.090 0.019 0.037 
           (0.114) (0.024) (0.027) (0.321) (0.024) (0.023) (0.061) (0.028) (0.023) 
LA -1.450** 0.189* -0.250** -0.692** 0.012 -0.027 -0.808 0.101 0.006 -0.883* -0.091 -0.225** -1.208* 0.050 -0.033 -0.091 -0.017 -0.004 
  (0.626) (0.108) (0.114) (0.331) (0.053) (0.063) (0.886) (0.151) (0.044) (0.458) (0.091) (0.089) (0.661) (0.058) (0.046) (0.234) (0.068) (0.040) 
SIZE 0.221*** -0.020* 0.007 0.130* -0.022* 0.017* 0.074 -0.029** 0.006 0.052* -0.024*** 0.004 0.118* -0.014** 0.019* 0.003 -0.024** 0.000 
  (0.075) (0.011) (0.008) (0.075) (0.013) (0.010) (0.072) (0.013) (0.007) (0.028) (0.007) (0.006) (0.062) (0.007) (0.010) (0.030) (0.010) (0.009) 
CR3 0.184 -0.023 -0.053** 0.288 0.053 0.030 0.090 -0.019 -0.022 -0.114 -0.010 -0.051** 1.707* 0.101 -0.032 -0.055 -0.043 -0.039* 
  (0.418) (0.031) (0.022) (1.600) (0.121) (0.085) (0.618) (0.074) (0.019) (0.076) (0.040) (0.021) (0.941) (0.148) (0.145) (0.078) (0.040) (0.022) 
OUTGAP -1.181 1.266** 0.248* -0.956 0.930 -0.300 4.218 0.810 0.087 0.481 0.626 0.203 12.991 0.237 0.258 1.829** 1.094*** 1.061*** 
  (1.204) (0.489) (0.142) (8.270) (0.687) (0.595) (7.824) (0.672) (0.206) (0.694) (0.401) (0.145) (14.979) (1.090) (0.551) (0.911) (0.345) (0.301) 
INTEREST -0.003 0.003 -0.005* 0.009 0.010* 0.001 -0.058 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.004* 0.112* 0.010 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 0.001 
  (0.025) (0.002) (0.002) (0.040) (0.005) (0.002) (0.044) (0.011) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.056) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) 
POLSTAB 0.031 0.015 -0.002 0.203 -0.075* 0.027 -0.042 0.023 -0.004 -0.005 0.006 0.001 0.188 -0.010 0.014 0.002 0.024** -0.007 
  (0.089) (0.016) (0.010) (0.270) (0.040) (0.028) (0.180) (0.018) (0.006) (0.026) (0.010) (0.009) (0.409) (0.036) (0.024) (0.027) (0.011) (0.015) 
DCREDIT 1.595* -0.490** -0.022 -1.676 -0.448 0.252 1.604 -0.310 -0.024 -0.140 0.174 -0.022 -2.321 0.289 0.033 -0.184 -0.358 -0.129 
  (0.943) (0.234) (0.190) (6.837) (0.572) (0.304) (2.952) (0.259) (0.144) (0.673) (0.301) (0.171) (8.787) (0.602) (0.518) (0.600) (0.246) (0.101) 
REG2008 -2.079* 0.737*** 0.151 -0.118 0.087 -0.185 -0.419 0.898*** -0.009 -0.062 0.824*** 0.018 -0.212 0.655*** -0.007 0.243 0.030 -0.010 
  (1.077) (0.169) (0.123) (0.231) (0.054) (0.140) (0.357) (0.262) (0.014) (0.070) (0.167) (0.014) (1.275) (0.148) (0.026) (0.457) (0.029) (0.014) 
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.463 0.962*** 0.000 -0.381 0.000 -0.034 0.408 0.000 0.126 0.000 0.000 -0.172 0.000 0.797*** 0.035 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (2.402) (0.238) (0.000) (1.275) (0.000) (0.096) (0.555) (0.000) (0.109) (0.000) (0.000) (0.214) (0.000) (0.182) (0.121) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,048 1,048 1,048 398 398 398 650 650 650 1,048 1,048 1,048 398 398 398 650 650 650 
Number of banks 110 110 110 43 43 43 67 67 67 110 110 110 43 43 43 67 67 67 
Number of instruments 44 97 56 69 46 50 54 73 78 65 42 56 46 50 62 62 62 58 
AR1 Residual Test 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.084 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.098 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.001 
AR2 Residual Test 0.116 0.305 0.732 0.884 0.857 0.102 0.101 0.165 0.724 0.195 0.183 0.819 0.739 0.736 0.104 0.106 0.209 0.873 






We also run the regressions with the alternative risk measure, the loan loss reserves ratio 
(LLRL). We only report the results for the profitability measure ROA in Table 12, the results 
with the other profitability measures (NIM and ROE) are available from the authors upon 
request. The results confirm the positive significant relationship between capital ratio variations 
and bank profitability. Moreover, we find strong evidence for the regulatory hypothesis in 
LMICs, i.e. banks increase their capital together with their risk appetite, which is consistent 
with our predictions in Hypothesis 2. Also, the positive co-movement between capital ratio and 
business cycles variations is confirmed for LICs.  
Finally, as alternative estimation technique, we adopt the three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
estimation technique. The estimation results (for ROA as a profitability measure and Z-score 
as risk indicator) reported in Table 13 confirm our previous findings, i.e. positive significant 
impact of capital on banks profitability, as predicted in Hypothesis 1. We also find support for 
the regulatory hypothesis. The other results remain valid as well. 
Additional robustness analyses have been done. All the results are available upon request. 
Firstly, our use of the Z-score is not standard in the banking literature. We re-do our main table 
(Table 6) by using the common definition of the Z-score (insolvency risk: lower Z-score = 
higher insolvency risk). We show that the transformed Z-sore does not alter our results although 
we should change the interpretation of the estimated parameters. Secondly, we re-do our main 
table by winsorizing variables at 1 percent level. It is worth noting that this procedure does not 
lessen the impacts of outliers compared to the Tukey’s procedure. It is confirmed that capital 
has a positive and significant impact on bank’s performance. Capital does not significantly 
affect the bank risk exposure measured by the Z-score as found in the main table. The noticeable 
difference is higher impact of bank capital on profitability in low-income countries compared 
to lower-middle-income countries. Thirdly, we re-estimate the model for a sample of banks 
with only positive observations for the variables CAR, Z-score, ROA, ROE and NIM. We 
uncover the same main results except for one. We find that bank profitability is sensitive to 
changes in capital ratios and the regulatory hypothesis is no longer valid. Moreover, we find a 
non-significant positive relationship between output gap and capital. Again, the effect of foreign 
and Pan-African ownership on risk is not clear-cut. Fourthly, we control for State versus private 
sector ownership status by using a dummy variable that takes 1 when more than 50% of 
shareholding held by the private sector, meaning that private investors are the majority 





Estimation of the system with ROA as profitability measure and LLRL as risk measure 
This table reports the estimation results for three-equation system, with ROA as profitability measure, allowing for pan-African bank status and bank ownership structure. LLRL is the 
risk indicator. CAR is the capital-to-asset ratio. All the macro controls are lagged. The raw data for computing bank-specific variables were obtained from the Banking Commission 
of WAEMU, while the data for computing the rest of the variables were obtained from the BCEAO and the World Bank World Development Indicators and Worldwide Governance 
Indicators databases. The estimations are performed using the two-step generalized method of moments estimation technique. We use forward orthogonal deviations to purge banks’ 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Superscripts ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  AFRICAN FOREIGN 
  Full Sample Lower-middle income Low income Full Sample Lower-middle income Low income 
  ΔROA ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔROA ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔROA ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔROA ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔROA ΔRISK ΔCAR ΔROA ΔRISK ΔCAR 
ROA(-1) -0.751***   -0.820***   -0.761***   -0.782***   -0.846***   -0.726***   
  (0.061)   (0.071)   (0.104)   (0.066)   (0.070)   (0.083)   
ΔROA  -0.022*** 0.319***  -0.026* 0.390***  -0.012* 0.176**  -0.017** 0.274***  -0.024 0.334**  -0.017* 0.184 
   (0.008) (0.095)  (0.013) (0.132)  (0.007) (0.074)  (0.008) (0.078)  (0.017) (0.161)  (0.010) (0.455) 
RISK(-1)  -0.152***   -0.258***   -0.127*   -0.117**   -0.255***   -0.194**  
   (0.049)   (0.079)   (0.072)   (0.049)   (0.082)   (0.087)  
ΔRISK -0.642***  -0.555 -0.762***  -0.133 -0.795***  -0.758** -0.376***  -0.533 -0.805***  -0.233 -0.595***  -0.819* 
  (0.111)  (0.398) (0.192)  (0.774) (0.200)  (0.365) (0.128)  (0.400) (0.164)  (0.815) (0.168)  (0.477) 
CAR(-1)   -0.289***   -0.290**   -0.289***   -0.292***   -0.253*   -0.267*** 
    (0.068)   (0.132)   (0.076)   (0.071)   (0.127)   (0.092) 
ΔCAR 0.092*** 0.005  0.081** 0.012*  0.086*** -0.005  0.091*** -0.000  0.089* 0.013**  0.076** -0.003  
  (0.017) (0.005)  (0.031) (0.006)  (0.031) (0.005)  (0.019) (0.005)  (0.048) (0.006)  (0.030) (0.004)  
AFRICAN 0.001 -0.001 0.070** 0.011 -0.001 -0.014 0.000 0.000 0.028          
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.032) (0.015) (0.002) (0.024) (0.014) (0.002) (0.029)          
FOREIGN          -0.051** 0.006* 0.010 -0.013 -0.003 0.090 -0.005 -0.004 0.037 
           (0.021) (0.003) (0.031) (0.028) (0.004) (0.069) (0.012) (0.007) (0.029) 
LA 0.017 0.000 0.013 -0.057* -0.006 -0.061 0.067* 0.004 0.015 0.004 0.004 -0.036 -0.039 0.006 -0.180 0.054** -0.002 0.025 
  (0.011) (0.003) (0.041) (0.029) (0.011) (0.101) (0.036) (0.005) (0.047) (0.019) (0.008) (0.045) (0.043) (0.009) (0.185) (0.027) (0.005) (0.039) 
SIZE 0.006*** 0.001 0.026*** 0.011*** 0.000 0.019 0.010*** 0.001 0.003 0.006** 0.001** 0.007 0.007 -0.001 0.040*** 0.007** 0.000 0.007 
  (0.002) (0.000) (0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.016) (0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.003) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.015) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) 
CR3 -0.008 -0.001 0.039 0.058 -0.004 0.161 0.006 0.001 -0.008 -0.011 -0.002 -0.008 0.072 -0.019* 0.555 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.007) (0.002) (0.043) (0.037) (0.015) (0.416) (0.010) (0.002) (0.025) (0.007) (0.006) (0.019) (0.045) (0.010) (0.424) (0.006) (0.003) (0.037) 
OUTGAP 0.011 0.030** -0.225 0.158 -0.133* 1.182 -0.042 0.027 0.238** 0.106 0.007 -0.038 0.245 -0.079 -1.348 -0.023 0.022 0.013 
  (0.044) (0.013) (0.157) (0.260) (0.074) (1.846) (0.066) (0.025) (0.103) (0.097) (0.016) (0.138) (0.285) (0.061) (1.506) (0.049) (0.051) (0.166) 
INTEREST -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.000 0.021 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.022) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
POLSTAB -0.002 -0.000 0.013 -0.013 0.005 -0.076 -0.002 0.000 0.003 -0.009** -0.000 0.013 -0.017 0.004 -0.016 -0.004 0.001 0.000 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.011) (0.016) (0.004) (0.100) (0.004) (0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.011) (0.022) (0.004) (0.047) (0.003) (0.001) (0.010) 
DCREDIT -0.099** -0.020* 0.292** -0.156 0.099 -0.486 -0.133* -0.017 -0.015 -0.082 -0.020* 0.211* -0.062 0.051 0.489 -0.086 -0.015 0.244* 
  (0.048) (0.012) (0.117) (0.153) (0.061) (1.481) (0.074) (0.013) (0.121) (0.075) (0.011) (0.114) (0.188) (0.038) (0.665) (0.054) (0.018) (0.140) 
REG2008 -0.061*** 0.001 -0.405*** -0.015 -0.002 -0.214 -0.143*** -0.005 -0.036 0.003 -0.012 -0.010 -0.065 0.010 -0.704* -0.103** 0.004* -0.145 
  (0.022) (0.001) (0.141) (0.015) (0.003) (0.343) (0.039) (0.009) (0.112) (0.036) (0.008) (0.012) (0.086) (0.012) (0.386) (0.042) (0.002) (0.101) 
Constant 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.060 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.099) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,169 1,169 1,169 450 450 450 719 719 719 1,169 1,169 1,169 450 450 450 719 719 719 
Number of banks 113 113 113 46 46 46 67 67 67 113 113 113 46 46 46 67 67 67 
Number of instruments 109 54 56 57 51 71 79 59 61 75 49 70 51 51 50 64 46 43 
AR1 Residual Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 
AR2 Residual Test 0.222 0.248 0.756 0.555 0.156 0.349 0.129 0.945 0.385 0.533 0.435 0.840 0.454 0.187 0.897 0.115 0.831 0.399 





3SLS estimation of the system with ROA and Z-SCORE as profitability and risk indicators 
This table reports estimation results for a three-equation system, with ROA and Z-SCORE as profitability and risk indicators. LLRL is the risk indicator. CAR is the capital-to-asset ratio. 
All the macro controls are lagged. The raw data for computing bank-specific variables were obtained from the Banking Commission of WAEMU, while the data for computing the rest of 
the variables were obtained from the BCEAO and the World Bank World Development Indicators and Worldwide Governance Indicators databases. The estimations are performed using 
the two-step generalized method of moments estimation technique. We use forward orthogonal deviations to purge banks’ fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Superscripts 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  AFRICAN FOREIGN 
  Full sample Lower-middle income  Low income  Full sample Lower-middle income  Low income  




  -0.546***   -0.566***   -0.563***   -0.547***   -0.564***   
  (0.029)   (0.046)   (0.037)   (0.029)   (0.046)   (0.037)   
ΔROA  0.091 0.585***  0.096 0.746***  0.003 0.466***  0.085 0.586***  0.107 0.733***  -0.002 0.469*** 
   (0.152) (0.058)  (0.197) (0.091)  (0.219) (0.077)  (0.152) (0.058)  (0.198) (0.092)  (0.219) (0.077) 
RISK(-1)  -0.555***   -0.706***   -0.521***   -0.557***   -0.705***   -0.523***  
   (0.026)   (0.046)   (0.033)   (0.026)   (0.046)   (0.033)  
ΔRISK 0.001  0.010 0.010  0.000 -0.003  0.021* 0.001  0.011 0.010  -0.000 -0.003  0.021* 
  (0.005)  (0.010) (0.009)  (0.020) (0.005)  (0.012) (0.005)  (0.010) (0.009)  (0.020) (0.005)  (0.012) 
CAR(-1)   -0.170***   -0.182***   -0.164***   -0.167***   -0.174***   -0.163*** 
    (0.018)   (0.033)   (0.023)   (0.018)   (0.032)   (0.023) 
ΔCAR 0.166*** 0.090  0.204*** -0.023  0.138*** 0.238**  0.166*** 0.089  0.202*** -0.031  0.139*** 0.238**  
  (0.013) (0.077)  (0.021) (0.102)  (0.017) (0.108)  (0.013) (0.077)  (0.021) (0.102)  (0.017) (0.108)  
Cross-border -0.001 0.003 -0.005 0.001 0.014 -0.009* -0.002 -0.001 -0.003          
  (0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.005) (0.002) (0.010) (0.003)          
Ownership          0.001 0.010 -0.001 0.003 0.011 0.002 -0.001 0.008 -0.003 
           (0.001) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.005) (0.002) (0.011) (0.004) 
LA 0.007 -0.039 0.001 0.003 -0.016 -0.004 0.012 -0.061 0.009 0.007 -0.043 0.002 0.001 -0.026 -0.003 0.011 -0.064 0.009 
  (0.005) (0.031) (0.012) (0.008) (0.036) (0.017) (0.007) (0.047) (0.017) (0.005) (0.031) (0.012) (0.008) (0.036) (0.018) (0.007) (0.047) (0.017) 
SIZE 0.003*** -0.014*** 0.002* 0.004*** -0.009** 0.002 0.002*** -0.020*** 0.003* 0.003*** -0.015*** 0.003** 0.004*** -0.010*** 0.002 0.003*** -0.020*** 0.003** 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) 
CR3 -0.002 -0.020 -0.008 0.033 0.208 -0.009 0.000 -0.027 -0.016 -0.003 -0.020 -0.009 0.032 0.202 -0.006 -0.000 -0.028 -0.017 
  (0.006) (0.033) (0.013) (0.030) (0.136) (0.066) (0.007) (0.045) (0.016) (0.006) (0.033) (0.013) (0.030) (0.136) (0.066) (0.007) (0.045) (0.016) 
OUTGAP -0.016 0.640** 0.085 -0.026 0.598 0.311 0.000 0.872** 0.135 -0.018 0.635** 0.084 -0.028 0.569 0.327 0.001 0.875** 0.136 
  (0.055) (0.315) (0.123) (0.184) (0.835) (0.404) (0.068) (0.439) (0.156) (0.055) (0.314) (0.123) (0.183) (0.836) (0.405) (0.068) (0.438) (0.156) 
INTEREST -0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.002 0.010* -0.001 -0.001* -0.004 0.003* -0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.002 0.009 -0.000 -0.001* -0.004 0.003* 
  (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
POLSTAB -0.002 0.017* 0.001 -0.012* -0.041 0.018 -0.003 0.028** -0.005 -0.002 0.017** 0.001 -0.012* -0.040 0.016 -0.003 0.028** -0.005 
  (0.001) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) (0.031) (0.015) (0.002) (0.013) (0.005) (0.001) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) (0.031) (0.015) (0.002) (0.013) (0.005) 
DCREDIT -0.030 -0.073 -0.031 -0.080 0.113 0.032 -0.017 -0.165 -0.012 -0.030 -0.070 -0.033 -0.082 0.127 0.011 -0.018 -0.163 -0.013 
  (0.029) (0.168) (0.065) (0.099) (0.452) (0.219) (0.033) (0.211) (0.075) (0.029) (0.168) (0.065) (0.099) (0.452) (0.220) (0.033) (0.211) (0.075) 
REG2008 -0.004 0.012 -0.008 0.018 0.122* -0.015 -0.003 0.053 -0.024* -0.005 0.011 -0.010 0.018 0.122* -0.016 -0.004 0.051 -0.024* 
  (0.004) (0.025) (0.010) (0.016) (0.073) (0.035) (0.006) (0.038) (0.014) (0.004) (0.025) (0.010) (0.016) (0.073) (0.035) (0.006) (0.038) (0.014) 
Constant -0.027** 0.669*** -0.010 -0.077** 0.439*** 0.021 -0.027* 0.734*** -0.015 -0.029*** 0.670*** -0.015 -0.076** 0.461*** 0.008 -0.028** 0.728*** -0.015 
  (0.011) (0.066) (0.023) (0.036) (0.165) (0.077) (0.014) (0.091) (0.030) (0.011) (0.065) (0.023) (0.035) (0.165) (0.077) (0.014) (0.091) (0.030) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,041 1,041 1,041 396 396 396 645 645 645 1,041 1,041 1,041 396 396 396 645 645 645 






6. Conclusion  
This paper has investigated the simultaneous relationship among bank capital, risk and 
profitability, considering bank ownership status, specifically foreign ownership and Pan-
African cross-border status, with respect to all WAEMU countries over the period 2000-2014. 
We seek to add new dimensions to the existing literature in terms of the empirical framework, 
the data, the classification of the sample countries and their capital regulatory challenges, the 
alternative measurements of bank capital, risk and profitability and the consideration of three 
new issues, namely: the influence of the business cycle; the effect of foreign bank ownership; 
and the effect of Pan-African cross-border bank ownership. 
The focus on WAEMU banks, using hand-collected data from the regional central bank, 
is particularly relevant here to generate new evidence not only on existing controversies in the 
literature (e.g. the relationship between capital and risk as well as capital and profitability) but 
also to shed more light on the WAEMU banking system, with its heterogeneity of banks which 
exist in a seemingly homogenous regional block with a single central bank.  
Among the main interesting results of this paper, four new findings should be noted. 
Firstly, we find a positive relationship between bank capital and profitability, as predicted in 
Hypothesis 1. The effect of bank capital on profitability seems to be somewhat higher in lower-
middle income WAEMU countries (+0.10) than in low income countries (+0.05). It is 
interesting that although WAEMU is taken to be a regional monetary block, the heterogeneity 
in the banks and financial structure does matter, and the classification of the countries into low 
income countries and lower middle-income countries yields useful insights. The different levels 
of financial sector development and the institutional backgrounds of the countries within the 
WAEMU region seem to matter. Secondly, we uncover a positive relationship between bank 
risk and bank capital, consistent with the regulatory hypothesis: on average, one-unit percentage 
increase in capital ratio leads to 1.2 basis points increase in bank credit risk (loan loss reserves 
ratio) in lower-middle income countries and 23.8 basis points increase in bank risk (Z-score) in 
low income countries. These results also confirm the predictions of Hypothesis 2. Thirdly, we 
find that bank capital positions tend to co-move positively with the business cycle in low 
income countries as opposed to their lower-middle income peers, as predicted in Hypothesis 3. 
This positive cyclical movement of bank capital positions in LICs mimics a key postulate of 
Basel III. Fourthly, the results show that the presence of French banks reduces risk, while the 




predicted in Hypothesis 4. In general, these findings are robust to the use of competing measures 
of risk and profitability, and to alternative estimation techniques. 
In terms of policy implications, the empirical results of our paper imply that in 
implementing Basel III, the WAEMU bank regulatory authorities must bear in mind that ‘one 
size fits all’ does not work for all the eight WAEMU countries. Rather, the heterogeneity of the 
countries, in a seemingly homogenous regional economic community, into LICs and LMICs 
must be recognized because an increase in capital ratio affects bank profitability and bank risk 
appetite differently. Moreover, the banking regulator of the region should pay careful attention 
to the capital behavior of banks operating in LMICs, as these banks, which are on average the 
largest, seem to have procyclical behavior, contrary to what is being proposed by Basel III. The 
policy challenge here is that while bank capital positions tend to imply countercyclical lending 
in LICs, mimicking a key postulate of Basel III, they encourage procyclical lending behaviour 
in LMICs. 
Overall, these findings are important not only for the implementation of the adopted 
Basel III regulation and the cautious balance among bank capital ratios, risk-taking and 
profitability by bank regulators, but also for bank managers who take bank portfolio decisions. 
There are some interesting ideas for further research, including the design of capital buffers, 
the risk-taking behavior of cross-border banks, the competition in the banking sector, the 





Appendix A: Relevant aspects of WAEMU banking sector regulation 
Central to issues of bank capital, risk and profitability in the WAEMU region is the fact that 
the banking sector in the region is overseen by three supervisory bodies: The Council of 
Ministers, the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO18) and the Banking Commission. 
The Council of Ministers is the supreme organ with remit for the BCEAO and the Banking 
Commission. The BCEAO is empowered to take any measures concerning instruments and 
rules related to the credit policy applicable to credit institutions, including compulsory reserves 
and the fees and conditions of the operations made by these institutions with their clients. The 
control of the banking activity is entrusted to the Banking Commission of the WAEMU. This 
last regulatory body was created on April 24th, 1990 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso at the 
WAEMU headquarters by an agreement signed by the Ministers of Finance of member states. 
This agreement was revised on April 6th, 2007 in Lomé, Togo.  
The role of the Banking Commission is to ensure a consistent and effective supervision of 
banking activity in the WAEMU. The Commission’s mission covers, primarily: the approval 
and withdrawal of authorization of credit institutions; the control of credit institutions and 
decentralized financial systems; and the liquidation of credit institutions.  
The prudential framework until December 31st, 2017 was strongly inspired by Basel I 
regulation with a minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8%.19 Bank core capital must be at least 
equal to the statutory minimum capital following the prudential framework in force since 
January 1st, 2000 (BCEAO, 2013). The minimum capital threshold was XOF 1 billion from 
2000 until end of 2007. At the Council of Ministers of the Union regular session of September 
17th, 2007, it was raised to XOF 5 billion with effect from 2008. Following the Council of 
Ministers meeting on March 30th, 2015, it was raised further to XOF 10 billion, with a grace 
period which allows banks to conform to this new standard by July 1st, 2017 at the latest. These 
successive increases in the minimum capital level and the recent adoption of the macro-
prudential Basel III regulation aim at promoting a healthy, strong and stable banking and 
financial system, which in turn, is expected to effectively contribute to the financing of the 
economic development of WAEMU member States. 
                                                 
18 BCEAO stands for Banque Centrale des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest. It is the central bank of the eight (8) 
countries of the WAEMU. 
19 But the regional banking regulator adopted recently new capital adequacy rules in the spirit of Basel III effective 
in January 1st, 2018: BCEAO, “Dispositif prudentiel applicable aux établissements de crédit et aux compagnies 





Over our study period, the bank supervision is compliant with the risk-based prudential 
framework of Basel I.20 Table A1 gives a summary of the prudential framework in WAEMU 
based on this instruction.  
 
Table A1 
Summary of prudential regulation in WAEMU 
The table presents some key indicators of the solvency ratios, the definition of each ratio and the 
threshold of the ratio in force since 2000 until December 31st, 2017. Also presented in the table are 
other prudential regulatory ratios used in WAEMU, their definitions and the thresholds before and after 
2013.  
Indicator Definition Threshold  
Solvency ratios 
Minimum capital requirement Core capital 
XOF 1 billon before 2008 
XOF 5 billion, 2008-2015 




8% (until December 31st, 2017) 
Limitation of fixed assets and 
participations 
Fixed assets and 




Coverage of the medium and 
long-term assets by stable 
liabilities 
Transformation ratio 
75% before 2013 
50% since January 1st, 2013 
Limitation of commitments on a 
same signature 
Total exposure on the same 
beneficiary or the same 
signature divided by Equity 
75% 
Limiting the overall volume of 
individual risks 
Exposure on all the 
beneficiaries reaching 
individually 25% of the 
equity divided by Equity 
8 
Limitation of loans to major 
shareholders, managers and staff 
Total loans to major 
shareholders, managers and 
staff divided by Equity 
20% 
Portfolio structure ratio 
Performing loans divided by 
Total loans 
60%, but no longer in force since 
2013 
Liquidity ratio 
Liquid assets divided by 






                                                 
20 Instruction N°2000/01/RB relating to the modalities of application of the prudential framework applicable to 
banks and financial institutions of the WAEMU. 








Some indicators of access to financial services 
This table reports, for each of the WAEMU countries, two indicators on the access 
to financial services. The data are from the Global Financial Development Database 
of the World Bank (extraction on January 5th, 2018). It is worth noting that the 
banking sector of the region is small and access to financial services is heterogeneous 
and limited even though it has been improving over the years. For example, the 
number of ATMs is close to one per 1,000 adults in Niger while this number reaches 
6.75 in Ivory Coast and 4.96 in Senegal in 2014. The highest number of bank 
accounts per 1,000 adults in the region is found in Togo, but does not exceed 250 
accounts per 1,000 adults over the period 2010-2014. 
 ATMs per 100,000 adults Bank accounts per 1,000 adults 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Benin 2.42 2.76 3.44 4.3 4.33 106.49 118.9 128.41 139.82 155.37 
Burkina Faso 1.35 2.22 2.31 2.66 3.21 78.64 90.51 105.45 112.27 126.55 
Ivory Coast 3.76 4.56 4.41 5.69 6.75 129.71 218.25 182.52 185.62 202.76 
Guinea-Bissau 1.36 1.33 1.89 3.67 .. 43.5 57.22 69.08 58.1 71.99 
Mali 2.68 3.19 3.33 3.94 4.23 95.9 122.61 152.2 141.76 143.52 
Niger 0.59 0.92 0.93 1.26 1.28 26.44 30.67 35.25 41.34 50.82 
Senegal 3.92 4.57 4.86 4.81 4.96 102.34 132.43 131.53 149.08 163.44 
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